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ABSTRACT
The first essay, Funding Liquidity and Its Risk Premiums, presents a new approach to
measure funding liquidity and demonstrates that the estimated funding liquidity can predict
future stock market returns. The key idea is that, as capital constraints become more
binding, speculators withdraw first from small stocks and then from large stocks. Given
that asset liquidity is provided by speculators, the asset liquidity of large and small stocks
would covary di↵erently with shocks to speculators’ capital depending on their participation
in the markets. Based on this intuition, funding liquidity is measured as the di↵erence of
rolling correlations of stock market returns with large and small stocks’ asset liquidity. The
estimated funding liquidity appears positively correlated with aggregate hedge fund leverage
ratios, stock market sentiments, and the total number of M&A activities, and negatively
correlated with bond liquidity premiums and Moody’s Baa-Aaa corporate bond spreads.
The funding liquidity is able to predict future stock market returns, and its forecasting
power is significant in both in-sample and out-of-sample tests. It is also robust to various
equity premium predictors, subsample periods, long-horizon forecast bias, and small-sample
bias.
The second essay, Treasury Bill Yields: Overlooked Information, considers whether the
term structure of Treasury bond yields reflects all risk premium factors that a↵ect their
rates of return; that is, whether risk premium factors are spanned the cross-section of
Treasury bond yields. The findings reveal that bond risk premiums consist of two factors
with di↵erent frequencies: long term and short term. The long-term factor raises the slope
of a yield curve, has the forecastability horizon of longer than one year, is related to value
premiums in the stock market, and predicts macroeconomic growth. In contrast, the short-
term factor is completely hidden from Treasury bond yields yet apparently lowers Treasury
bill yields, has the forecastability horizon of less than one quarter, is related to stock market
returns, and is largely attributed to liquidity premiums.
The third essay, Systematic Volatility of Unpriced Earnings Shocks, focuses on the dif-
ferent implications of two stochastic volatility factors. Some important puzzles in macro
finance can be resolved in a model featuring systematically varying volatility of unpriced
shocks to firms’ earnings. In the data, the correlation between corporate debt and stock
markets valuations is low. The model accounts for this via the opposing e↵ect of firm-level
uncertainty on levered debt and equity prices. The model also explains the low (or non-
existant) risk-reward relation for the market portfolio of levered equity, via the opposing
e↵ects of firm-level and aggregate uncertainty (both components of stock volatility) on the
ii
levered equity risk premium. A testable implication of the model is that the disagreement
between debt and equity markets may be a good proxy for systematic changes to unpriced
earnings uncertainty. Comparison with direct measures of micro volatility supports this
interpretation. The proxy shows strong forecasting power for market returns.
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1 Funding Liquidity and Its Risk Premiums
1.1 Introduction
The financial media often relates asset price booms to excess liquidity in the financial system.
Conversely, it is also repeatedly told that risky assets become more discounted during
a liquidity crisis.1 If this is true, high liquidity would forecast low market excess returns.
However, there has not been any strong evidence to date to support the forecastability.2 The
lack of evidence suggests two possibilities. First, liquidity is not related to the discount rates
of the financial markets. Given a number of theories regarding liquidity’s risk premiums,3
however, this is very unlikely. Second, liquidity a↵ects the discount rates, but its measures–
at least those used for forecastability tests–have been inadequate.
The answer lies in the distinction between two types of liquidity: asset liquidity and
funding liquidity. Asset liquidity is the ease with which an asset is traded. Funding liquidity
is the capacity for a trader to raise funds. These two types of liquidity reinforce each other
(see Kyle and Xiong (2001), Gromb and Vayanos (2002), and Brunnermeier and Pedersen
(2009)).
Their feedback relationship is often called the ‘liquidity spiral.’ A small capital loss
can prevent risk-neutral speculators from providing enough asset liquidity to markets, thus
raising margin requirements and further limiting their liquidity-providing activity.4 As a
result, risk-averse investors would end up paying high premiums for asset liquidity. Thus,
the liquidity spiral can be attributed to the combined e↵ects of margin requirements and
speculators’ capital, which are denoted by funding liquidity. Funding liquidity is considered
low when speculators have little capital relative to margin requirements.
The first question is how to estimate funding liquidity empirically. I suggest a novel ap-
1Diamond and Rajan (2006) show that the need to raise cash can lead to fire sales of risky assets so that
liquidity problems can escalate into solvency issues.
2All liquidity measures currently available in the literature fail to predict future stock market returns,
or marginally succeed at best. For example, Jones (2002) compiles the bid-ask spreads of all 30 Dow Jones
Industrial Average (DJIA) stocks since 1896 and tests the hypothesis, but fails to find any forecastability
from the spreads during the post-war period. Amihud (2002) estimates illiquidity indirectly as the average
of absolute stock returns normalized by trading volumes, but this illiquidity measure is unable to predict
future stock returns by itself either.
3For example, Johnson (2009) shows a negative monotonic relationship between liquidity and expected
excess returns. Vayanos and Wang (2009) survey how market imperfections a↵ect liquidity and find that
low liquidity is related to high expected returns in most cases.
4For details of the liquidity spiral, one can refer to Allen and Gale (1994), Brunnermeier and Pedersen
(2009), Fostel and Geanakoplos (2008), Geanakoplos (2009), Geanakoplos (2010) among many others.
1
proach by combining two pieces of intuition. First, speculators prefer trading large stocks to
small ones during a liquidity crisis.5 Second, negative stock market returns are followed by
decreasing asset liquidity since market returns cause exogenous capital shocks to specula-
tors.6 Having put them together, one can expect that, during a crisis, large stocks’ liquidity
becomes more correlated with market returns than small stocks’ liquidity because of spec-
ulators’ withdrawal from small stocks. In good times, however, large and small stocks’
liquidity would be equally correlated with market returns. Building on the intuition, I esti-
mate two rolling correlations (one is between large stocks’ liquidity and market returns and
the other is between small stocks’ liquidity and market returns) and use their di↵erence as
a proxy of funding liquidity.
This paper derives a model to describe speculators’ trading patterns. It assumes two
risky assets, large (less volatile) and small (more volatile) stocks, and three agents: a cus-
tomer, a speculator, and a financier. The customer is risk averse, holds the total fixed sup-
plies of the risky assets, and immediately trades them to hedge their risks. The speculator is
risk neutral and makes profits by taking the other side of the customer’s liquidity-motivated
trades. The financier funds the speculator’s trades but also restricts them by demanding
margin requirements.
In the equilibrium, the liquidity of large and small stocks varies depending on the spec-
ulator’s participation. As borrowing constraints become more binding, the speculator with-
draws first from high volatility (small) stocks and then from low volatility (large) stocks.
This movement is due to the fact that high volatility stocks require higher margins to be
traded. As a result, the liquidity of each group of stocks covaries di↵erently with shocks
to speculators’ capital. When the speculator is unconstrained, he fully takes part in both
markets. So, shocks to the speculator’s capital generate similar variation in the asset liq-
uidity of the two assets. However, if the speculator is constrained, he participates more in
the market for large stocks than in the market for small stocks. In this case, shocks to the
speculator’s capital are more negatively correlated with the asset liquidity of large stocks
5Ben-David, Franzoni, and Moussawi (2011) analyze the trading patterns of hedge funds during the global
financial crisis and find that they sold more high- than low-volatility stocks and shifted their portfolio towards
larger stocks during the crisis. Anand, Irvine, Puckett, and Venkataraman (2011, p.1) also document that
“liquidity deteriorates more sharply and recovery patterns are slower for smaller, more volatile, and higher
(ex-ante) liquidity beta stocks” and “institutions avoid illiquid stocks and defensively tilt trading activity
towards liquid stocks.”
6Comerton-Forde, Hendershott, Jones, Moulton, and Seasholes (2010) show that the NYSE specialists
with deep pockets (e.g., a liation with other corporates) are less a↵ected by the negative market returns.
Hameed, Kang, and Viswanathan (2010) find that the negative market returns are still a strong predictor
of decreasing asset liquidity even after controlling for the changes in volatility.
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than small stocks. So the distance in this correlation between small and large stocks is
negatively related to the speculator’s capital, that is, funding liquidity.
In its empirical implementation, shocks to speculators’ capital are proxied by stock
market returns (see Hameed, Kang, and Viswanathan (2010) and Comerton-Forde, Hen-
dershott, Jones, Moulton, and Seasholes (2010)). The sensitivities of asset liquidity to the
speculators’ capital shocks are measured by the rolling correlations of stock market returns
with large and small stocks’ asset liquidity, which is estimated as in Amihud (2002). The
di↵erence of the two rolling correlations is used to estimate funding liquidity.
The estimated time series of funding liquidity is shown to reach a peak in the beginning
of recession but falls sharply to a low as recession ends. High funding liquidity predicts low
real GDP growth rates for the next two years. The estimated funding liquidity also appears
positively correlated with aggregate hedge fund leverage ratios and the total number of
M&A activities, and negatively correlated with bond liquidity premiums, Moody’s Baa-
Aaa corporate bond spreads, and the relative prevalence of liquidity mergers.7
The findings show that funding liquidity significantly forecasts aggregate stock market
returns. A decrease in funding liquidity by one standard deviation predicts an increase in
monthly excess returns by 0.56%. Its forecastability is significant both in in-sample and out-
of-sample tests, and robust to other equity premium predictors such as log valuations ratio,
variance premiums as the di↵erence between squared VIX and realized stock return vari-
ance, riskfree interest rates, Goyal and Santa-Clara’s (2003) average stock return variance,
Campbell and Vuolteenaho’s (2004) small-stock value spreads, Moody’s Baa-Aaa corpo-
rate bond spreads, Boudoukh, Michaely, Richardson, and Roberts’s (2007) total net payout
yields, Lettau and Ludvigson’s (2001) consumption-wealth ratio, and Pollet and Wilson’s
(2010) average correlation among individual stock returns. The forecastability is also robust
to the long-horizon forecast bias and the small-sample bias of predictive regressions,8 and
appears significant across all subperiods of the Bretten Woods System (1946–1970), the
pre-Volcker period (1971–1985), and the post-Volcker period (1986–2010). Market-timing
strategies based on funding liquidity could generate 82.5% higher Sharpe ratio than a simple
buy-and-hold strategy of stock market index funds.
The up-to-date evidence about liquidity’s risk premiums is found from the cross-section
of stock portfolio returns. For example, Pastor and Stambaugh (2003), Acharya and Ped-
7Liquidity mergers are defined by Almeida, Campello, and Hackbarth (2011) as liquid firms’ acquiring
financially distressed firms which would be otherwise ine ciently terminated.
8For details about the small-sample bias of predictive regressions, refer to Mankiw and Shapiro (1985),
Nelson and Kim (1993), Stambaugh (1999), and Lewellen (2004).
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ersen (2005), and Jensen and Moorman (2010) form stock portfolios based on stocks’ liq-
uidity or their sensitivity to market liquidity, and find significant evidence that less liquid
(or, more sensitive to market liquidity) stocks provide higher returns. Amihud and Mendel-
son (1986) show that expected stock returns are increasing with bid-ask spreads. Sadka
(2006) decomposes asset liquidity into fixed and variable components and shows that the
variable component can explain 40%–80% of momentum and post-earnings-announcement-
drift portfolio returns. For this literature is to estimate asset liquidity’s premiums, however,
it is not able to explain high stock market returns that follow a liquidity crisis.
There are barely a few measures for funding liquidity, and most of the few measures
are either not directly related to the stock market or have time spans that are too short
to su ciently test asset pricing implications. For example, Fontaine and Garcia (2012)
estimate liquidity premiums using the yield di↵erence between on-the-run and o↵-the-run
Treasury bonds. In a similar vein, Hu, Pan, and Wang (2011) use the price deviations of
US Treasury bonds to proxy the limit of arbitrage due to speculators’ insu cient capital.
Ang, Gorovyy, and van Inwegen (2011) aggregate the leverage ratios of all hedge funds from
2005 to 2010, and Adrian and Shin (2010) and Jorda`, Schularick, and Taylor (2011) use
leverage ratios in the banking industry. However, none of these studies examine whether
the estimated funding liquidity is able to forecast future stock market excess returns.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 presents a model with two dates and
three market participants: a customer, a speculator and a financier. It explains why large
stocks are preferred to small stocks when the speculator is financially constrained. Sec-
tion 1.3 explains the estimation strategy and describes the time series of the estimated
funding liquidity. Section 1.4 discusses statistical tests that demonstrate funding liquidity’s
forecastability. Section 1.5 concludes.
1.2 Model
My model is a simplified version of Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009). The economy has
two risky assets (large and small stocks), and an equilibrium is made among three agents:
a customer, a speculator, and a financier. The customer is risk-averse and trades his initial
holdings of risky assets to hedge risk. The speculator is risk-neutral and makes profits by
taking the other side of the customer’s trades. The financier determines the speculator’s
borrowing constraints, which is a main friction in the economy. The model implies that,
when the borrowing constraints are binding, the speculator prefers trading large stocks to
small ones since large stocks require lower margins. As a result, an exogenous shock to
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the speculator’s capital becomes increasingly more correlated with large stocks’ liquidity
relative to small stocks’ as the shadow cost of the constraints rises.
1.2.1 The Economy
The economy has two risky assets, and the assets are in the fixed supply of one share for
each. Risk-free interest rate is normalized to zero. There are two dates: t = 0, 1. At time
t = 1, each securities j pays o↵ v(j). The terminal payo↵s v(j) are random variables which
would be realized at t = 1, but their distributions are known ex ante at t = 0.
v ⇠ N ( v¯, ⌦ ) where ⌦ ⌘
"  
 (a)
 2
⇢  (a)  (b)
⇢  (a)  (b)
 
 (a)
 2
#
(1)
The economy has three market participants: a customer, a speculator, and a financier.
They can be considered a representative agent of each class. Their objectives are treated
separately by following subsections.
1.2.2 Customer
A customer holds the total fixed supplies of risky assets, one share for each, at t = 0. The
customer immediately trades y shares to maximize his exponential utility (CARA) function
over final wealth. His objective function subject to wealth constraint can be written as
max
y
E0
h
  exp
⇣
  W (c)1
⌘i
(2)
s.t. W (c)1 = p
>
0 1+ (v   p0)>(y + 1) (3)
where   denotes the coe cient of absolute risk aversion,W (c)1 denotes the customer’s wealth
at t = 1, p0 denotes the market price of securities at t = 0, and 1 denotes a vector of
ones, 1 ⌘ [1, 1]>. p0 will be endogenously determined by the equilibrium among market
participants.
By solving the optimization problem in equation (2), a customer’s optimal trade is
derived as
y⇤ =
1
 
⌦ 1 (v¯   p0)  1 (4)
which is the sum of speculation and hedge components. According to the first term of (4),
the customer would buy more shares when the assets are underpriced, and the extent of this
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speculative trade is inversely proportional to his risk aversion and the di↵usions of terminal
asset payo↵s. The second term of (4) suggests that the customer would hedge away all of
his initial holdings of risky assets.
1.2.3 Speculator
A speculator is the second type of market participants. He is risk neutral, and trades x
shares of securities to maximize his profits.
max
x
E0
h
(v   p0)>x
i
= max
x
(v¯   p0)>x (5)
The speculator’s trades are constrained by margin requirements.   x(a)    m(a) +    x(b)    m(b) W (s)0 (6)
where m(j) denotes the margin requirement for trading securities j. The same amounts
of margins are required for both long and short positions. The margins are determined
by a financier using the Value-at-Risk (VaR) method, which will be explained in the next
subsection. W (s)0 denotes the speculator’s initial wealth.
1.2.4 Financier
A financier is the last market participant. He does not trade securities directly, but lend
funds to a speculator so that the speculator can leverage up his trades. For the sake of
simplicity, the financier is assumed to demand zero returns. However, he imposes margin
requirements to limit his potential loss from the uncertainties of asset payo↵s. A financier
uses the VaR (Value-at-Risk) method to determine the margins as
⇡ =
8<:P
⇣
v(j)   p(j)0 <  mj
⌘
for a long position
P
⇣
v(j)   p(j)0 > mj
⌘
for a short position
(7)
where ⇡ denotes the probability by which a loss may incur. The same margins are required
for both long and short positions.
Now assume that the financier is not aware of the ex ante expectation (v¯) of terminal
payo↵s. Instead, he wrongly believes that the market prices of securities at t = 0 are equal
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to the expected terminal payo↵s. In his belief,
v ⇠ bN ( p0, ⌦ ) (8)
Thus, by combining equation (7) and (8), the financier determines the margin for secu-
rities j as
m(j) =   1(1  ⇡) ·  (j) (9)
where  (·) denotes the cumulative distribution function of a standard normal random vari-
able. Equation (9) implies that trading riskier assets requires higher margins.
The model makes two assumptions. First, the financier uses p0 instead of v¯. Second,
margins are determined on an asset-basis rather than a portfolio. These assumptions are
actually optimal for the financier when information acquisition is costly. The first one saves
the e↵orts of collecting information about the securities meanwhile the second one saves the
costs of analyzing the speculator’s portfolio.
Even though the model divides a speculator and a financier’s roles, they do not have
to be separate corporate entities. They can be considered not only as a hedge fund and
a brokerage firm but also as a trading desk and a risk management back-o ce within an
investment bank.
1.2.5 Equilibrium
Risky assets are in fixed supplies. Thus, in equilibrium, a customer’s trade demands should
be matched with a speculator’s trades.
x+ y = 0 (10)
The speculator’s optimal trades can be derived by using the Lagrangian optimization
method,
x⇤ =
1
2
⇢
1   
 
⌦ 1 m˜
 
(11)
where   denotes the shadow cost of margin constraints.   is derived as
  =  
m˜>1  2W0
m˜>⌦ 1m˜
and m˜ ⌘
"
sign
 
x(a)
 
m(a)
sign
 
x(b)
 
m(b)
#
(12)
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if the speculator is constrained, and zero otherwise.
Note that this equilibrium is based on an implicit assumption that speculators collude to
maximize profits or one speculator monopolizes the given securities. In the absence of this
assumption, speculators would compete with each other and their profits would dissipate.
In this alternative scenario, speculators’ optimal trades (x) would be determined by the
condition at which marginal trading profits (levered returns) equal the shadow costs of
borrowing constraints.
1.2.6 Model’s Implication: Flight to Quality
The model is simulated with the following parameters.
v¯ =
h
5 1
i>
,   = 3, ⇡ = 0.01
 (a) = 0.5,  (b) = 0.15, ⇢ = 0.4
These parameters imply that Asset a and b correspond to large and small stocks. Asset
a’s ex ante expected payo↵ per share is five times bigger than Asset b’s, but the di↵u-
sion of Asset b’s terminal payo↵ is relatively 50% larger than that of Asset a’s payo↵ 
 (a)/v¯(a) = 0.1,  (b)/v¯(b) = 0.15
 
. ⇢ denotes the terminal payo↵s’ correlation. Speculator’s
initial wealth, W (s)0 , varies from zero to one.
Note that there are two di↵erent sources of risk premiums. One is the correlation to a
customer’s consumption, which is a primary source of risk premium for large stocks.9 The
other is the volatility of each asset’s terminal payo↵, which is a principal component of risk
premium to small stocks. The parameters above are engineered so that the discount rates
of large and small stocks become comparable.
Figure 1 shows how trades and discount rates respond to the speculator’s initial wealth⇣
W (s)0
⌘
. Panel (a) shows the speculator’s optimal trades, and Panel (b) shows the discount
rates which are defined as
⇣
v¯(j)   p(j)0
⌘
/v¯(j). Vertical lines divide the plots into three areas
depending on the margin constraints. The speculator is free of the constraints in area (a)
but becomes constrained as he moves into area (b) and (c). As the speculator’s initial
wealth decreases, his trades decline and the risky assets become more discounted.
9In a similar vein, Cochrane, Longsta↵, and Santa-Clara (2008) derive an equilibrium model with two
i.i.d. Lucas trees. One of their model’s implications is that a large tree is supposed to be discounted more
than a small tree due to the di↵erence of correlations to a representative agent’s consumption.
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Figure 1: Market Reaction to a Speculator’s Initial Wealth
This figure shows model-implied market reaction to a speculator’s initial wealth, which is
denoted by the horizontal axis. Panel (a) shows a speculator’s optimal trades and Panel
(b) shows the stocks’ expected returns (discount rates). Vertical lines divide the figure into
three areas depending on funding liquidity.
(a) Speculator’s Optimal Asset Trades (x)
(b) Expected Returns ((v¯   p0)/v¯)
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Area (a) shows that a speculator trades fixed amounts, x = 12 , when he is unconstrained.
He withdraws first from small stocks in area (b), and then from large stocks in area (c). His
preference for large stocks is due to the fact that holding large stocks requires lower margins
than small stocks. Therefore, even when large and small stocks have similar holding returns,
large stocks become more attractive to the speculator in terms of levered returns.
1.2.7 Simulated Correlation of Asset Liquidity with Market Returns
The previous section shows that the speculator prefers trading large stocks to small ones
when he is contained by margin requirements. This section intends to show how the behavior
a↵ects asset liquidity, which is measured by the price impacts of trades. An exogenous trade
shock (✏) is now added to the market clearing condition as follows
x+ y + ✏ = 0 (13)
The price impacts of trades, or asset illiquidity, are defined as the di↵erence of market price
given a trade shock (✏ˆ) normalized by the ex-ante expected payo↵ (v¯).
Price Impacts of Trades ⌘
     p0|✏=✏ˆ   p0|✏=0v¯
     (14)
Note that the price impacts are the function of trade shock and the speculator’s capital.
In Figure 1, for example, small stocks’ price impacts become the highest in area (b) in which
the speculator is bound by margin requirements but still participates in both markets. He
rapidly rebalances small stocks in his portfolio in the area, and this rebalancing activity
amplifies small stocks’ price impacts. Because of the same reason, large stocks’ price impacts
would peak in area (c).
In addition to the trade shock, this section assumes another exogenous shock to the
speculator’s capital. Meanwhile the trade shock directly a↵ects asset prices, the capital
shock a↵ects the speculator’s financial constraints and thereby his liquidity provision. For
example, a capital shock would a↵ect both assets’ liquidity in area (b) but only the large
stocks’ liquidity in area (c).
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The sensitivities of the two assets’ liquidity to the capital shock are defined as
⇢small = corr
⇣
Small Stocks’ Price Impacts of Trades, W (s)0 + ⌘
⌘
⇢large = corr
⇣
Large Stocks’ Price Impacts of Trades, W (s)0 + ⌘
⌘
(15)
where ⌘ denotes the exogenous capital shock. The trade shock is fixed at ✏ˆ =
h
 0.2,  0.2
i>
.
The price impacts are simulated by randomly drawing capital shocks from ⌘ ⇠ N  0, 0.32 .
The simulation is repeated for 10 million times for each value of W (s)0 .
Figure 2 shows the correlations of the simulated capital shocks and their price impacts
of trades. Panel (a) shows each asset’s correlation, and Panel (b) shows their di↵erence.
The horizontal axes denote W (s)0 , the speculator’s initial wealth prior to the capital shock.
In Panel (a), both correlations show U-shapes because they converge to zero as the
speculator becomes very rich. Remind that, if he is very rich, he will trade only the constant
amounts of stocks, 12 (1  ✏). In this case, the asset liquidity would be increasingly insensitive
to the capital shock. On the left end, in comparison, ⇢small goes positive since small stocks’
price impacts become the highest in the middle area. Meanwhile, ⇢large is always negative
since the large stocks’ price impacts become stronger as the speculator becomes poorer.
Note that the gap between the two correlations widens almost monotonically as the
speculator becomes poorer. The near-monotonic relationship between the di↵erence of
correlations and the speculator’s initial wealth o↵ers the key intuition of my measuring
funding liquidity in the next section.
1.3 Estimating Funding Liquidity
1.3.1 How to Measure Funding Liquidity?
The model explains why large stocks are preferred to small stocks when borrowing con-
straints are binding. Building on this, the last section shows that the di↵erence of two cor-
relations (⇢large   ⇢small) increases near-monotonically with the speculator’s wealth. This
section exploits the implication to construct an empirical proxy of the speculator’s wealth,
i.e., funding liquidity.
⇢small ⌘ corr (Small Stocks’ Illiquidity, Stock Market Returns) (16)
⇢large ⌘ corr (Large Stocks’ Illiquidity, Stock Market Returns) (17)
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Figure 2: Simulated Correlation of Asset Liquidity and Market Returns
This figure shows the simulated correlations between asset illiquidity, which is defined as
the price impact of a trade, and an exogenous shock to a speculator’s capital. His initial
wealth is now given as W (s)0 + ⌘ where ⌘ ⇠ N
 
0, 0.32
 
denotes the capital shock. The
horizontal axis denotes W (s)0 . Panel (a) shows the correlations and Panel (b) shows their
di↵erence.
(a) Simulated Correlations (⇢small and ⇢large)
(b) Di↵erence of Simulated Correlations (⇢large   ⇢small)
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where large and small stocks’ illiquidity is estimated by the Amihud (2002)’s measure of
the price impacts of trades, which is the average of absolute stock returns divided by dollar
trading volumes. Note that the capital shock is proxied by aggregate stock market returns,
which is based on Hameed, Kang, and Viswanathan (2010) and Comerton-Forde, Hender-
shott, Jones, Moulton, and Seasholes (2010)’s finding that market returns create exogenous
shocks to liquidity providers’ capital. The correlations are estimated over the rolling window
of previous 30 months.
Funding liquidity is measured as the di↵erence of the two correlations.
fliq ⌘ ⇢large   ⇢small (18)
I use CRSP daily stock returns from Jan 1946 to Dec 2010. Observations are dropped
if (i) trading activities are recorded for less than 10 days for a month, (ii) stock price is less
than $1 or higher than $1,000, (iii) stocks are not ordinary shares (share code of 10 or 11),
(iv) stocks are not traded by either NYSE, AMEX or NASDAQ, or (v) trading status is
not active.
Stocks are divided into size quintile portfolios based on total market capitalizations. I
estimate the Amihud measure for each stock and take their equal-weighted averages for
each portfolio every month. Some stocks are dropped if their illiquidity lie in the outside of
0.5 and 99.5 percentiles of each portfolio. Rolling correlations are estimated between each
portfolio’s asset liquidity and aggregate stock market returns. Funding liquidity is estimated
as the di↵erence between the largest and the smallest stock portfolios’ correlations.
Figure 3’s Panel (a) shows the two rolling correlations’ time series, one for the smallest
and the other for the largest quintile stocks. Large stocks’ correlations are negative in most
cases, but those of small stocks fluctuate around both positive and negative territories.
This pattern is consistent with Figure 2’s implication that ⇢small can be both positive and
negative meanwhile ⇢large is always negative.
Figure 3’s Panel (b) plots fliq’s time series. The shaded areas denote NBER recessions.
The figure shows that fliq tends to rise sharply in the beginning of recession but plunge
dramatically as recession nears to an end. It is consistent with a conventional wisdom that
recession is in part triggered by excessive liquidity in the financial market (Jorda`, Schularick,
and Taylor, 2011). As recession deepens subsequently, however, financiers tend to tighten
margin requirements to protect themselves from increasing risks.10 fliq’s local minimums
10For example, as recently as on November 9th, 2011, LCH Clearnet raised the margin calls of dealing in
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Figure 3: Time Series of Rolling Correlations and Their Di↵erence
Panel (a) shows the time series of rolling correlations between stock market excess returns
and each size portfolio’s asset illiquidity over the preceding 30 months. Panel (b) shows the
di↵erence of the two rolling correlations. This paper’s argument is that funding liquidity
can be estimated by the di↵erence of the two rolling correlations. The shaded areas denote
NBER recessions.
(a) Rolling Correlations (⇢small and ⇢large)
(b) Di↵erence of Rolling Correlations (⇢small   ⇢large)
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also coincide with financial crises such as the Tequila crisis in 1994, the Asian currency
crisis and the Russian moratorium in 1997–1998, and the global financial crisis in 2010.
1.3.2 Comparison with Other Benchmarks of Funding Liquidity
fliq is shown to be related to business cycles and financial crises. However, it still remains
not convincing enough whether fliq is really related to funding liquidity in the stock market.
This section will focus on the comparison of fliq with other funding liquidity benchmarks.
Figure 4’s Panel (a) compares fliq to aggregate hedge fund leverage ratio, which is
provided by Ang, Gorovyy, and van Inwegen (2011) for the sample period from December
2004 to September 2009. Funding liquidity is defined as speculators’ capacity to raise funds,
thus it should have been positively related to hedge fund leverage ratio. The figure shows
that both funding liquidity and hedge fund leverage ratio declined during the global financial
crisis, but fliq is lagging behind by almost one year. Except for the delay, however, their
time series are closely overlapped.
fliq’s delay can be attributed to two reasons. First, fliq is estimated over the past
30-month rolling window, which creates a mechanical delay by construction. This problem
can be solved by using high-frequency data to estimate fliq over the rolling window of 30
days instead of 30 months, but it couldn’t be tested yet due to the lack of access to high-
frequency data. Second, an alternative explanation is that hedge fund managers left the
market early in the anticipation of a looming crisis. For example, Ang, Gorovyy, and van
Inwegen (2011, p.120) argue that “hedge funds voluntarily reduced leverage much earlier
than banks.” The aggregate hedge fund leverage ratio gradually decreased after reaching a
peak at 2.6 in June 2007, which is well before the worst periods of the financial crisis. In
comparison, the leverage of investment banks soared to 40.7 in February 2009, in which the
TARP money was injected into the financial sector.
In Panel (b), fliq is compared to bond liquidity premium, which is estimated by Fontaine
and Garcia (2012) using the di↵erence of bond yields between on-the-run and o↵-the-run
Treasury bonds.11 The premiums are likely to be higher when the liquidity is scarcer or there
are stronger demands for liquidity in the bond market. If liquidity is contagious between the
stock and bond markets, fliq would be negatively correlated to the bond liquidity premium.
To make the comparison easy, the liquidity premiums are denoted on the right axis in a
Italian bonds amid the European debt crisis.
11I am grateful to Jean-Sebastien Fontaine and Rene Garcia for sharing the data.
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Figure 4: Comparing fliq to Other Measures of Liquidity
Panel (a) compares fliq to the aggregate hedge fund leverage ratio, which is provided by
Ang, Gorovyy, and van Inwegen (2011). Panel (b) compares fliq to the bond liquidity
premiums, which are estimated by Fontaine and Garcia (2012) using the di↵erence of bond
yields between on-the-run and o↵-the-run Treasury bonds. The bond liquidity premiums
are denoted in a reversed scale on the right axis since they become higher when liquidity is
scarcer in the market.
(a) Aggregate Hedge Fund Leverage Ratio (Ang, Gorovyy, and van Inwegen, 2011)
(b) Bond Risk Premium (Fontaine and Garcia, 2012)
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reversed scale. The figure confirms the high correlation between them. In particular, it
is notable that both time series show a sharp increase in 2001 and a rapid drop in 2008.
One di↵erence is that the bond liquidity premiums reached the peak at 3.08 in November
2008 and recovered to its normal level at 1.11 in June 2009 meanwhile fliq has gradually
decreased from  0.01 in November 2008 to  0.44 until September 2009 and has remained
at the bottom until 2010.
Figure 5 compares fliq with Moody’s Baa-Aaa credit spreads, which are provided by
the FRED database.12 The credit spreads are denoted on the right axis as log values in a
reversed scale since the spreads are likely to be high when liquidity is scarce.
The figure is divided into three subperiods based on two systemic events in the bond
market. The first event is the abolition the the Bretten Woods System in 1971, under which
the US government had been imposed to convert dollars into gold at the fixed exchange
rate of $35 an ounce. Since its abolition, investors had lost confidence in greenback, a fiat
money that is backed by no material means. High inflation due to the weakening confidence
in the fiat-money currency system along with the two oil shocks in the 1970s had crippled
the US economy until Paul Volcker crushed the inflation and restored investor confidence
in the early 1980s, which is considered the second systemic event by the figure.
The figure shows high correlation between fliq and the credit spreads. For example, high
funding liquidity is accompanied with low credit spreads in 1965–1966, 1973–1974, 1977–
1979, late 1983 and 1990. However, Panel (c) also shows notable diversions in 1994 and
1997–1998, during which fliq dropped rapidly but the credit spreads make little changes.
Considering the Tequila crisis in 1994, the Asian currency crisis in 1997, and the Russian
moratorium and the subsequent demise of the Long-Term Capital Management in 1998,
fliq seems to capture crisis periods better than the credit spreads. Moreover, Moody’s
Baa-Aaa spreads also fail to capture the excessive liquidity during the IT bubble in the
early 2000s although it is well captured by fliq.
Figure 6 compares fliq to the total number of mergers and acquisitions in Panel (a)
and the ratio of liquidity mergers in Panel (b). Liquidity mergers are defined by Almeida,
Campello, and Hackbarth (2011) as liquid firms’ acquiring financially distressed firms which
would be otherwise ine ciently terminated. Liquidity mergers can create values even in the
absence of operational synergies since they prevent ine cient termination of distressed firms
by reallocating liquidity. The M&A data are available from the paper’s Table 1 at an yearly
basis from 1980 to 2006. Note that the data are collected based on announcement dates,
12http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/categories/119
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Figure 5: Comparing fliq to Moody’s Baa-Aaa Credit Spreads
This figure compares fliq to Moody’s Baa-Aaa credit spreads for three subperiods, each of
which corresponds to each subfigure. The credit spreads are denoted on the right axis as
log values in a reversed scale.
(a) Bretton Woods System (1946 ⇠ 1971)
(b) Pre-Volcker Periods (1972 ⇠ 1985)
(c) Post-Volcker Periods (1986 ⇠ 2010)
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Figure 6: fliq and the Frequency of M&A Activities
This figure compares fliq to the total number of mergers and acquisitions in Panel (a)
and the ratio of liquidity mergers in Panel (b). Liquidity mergers are defined by Almeida,
Campello, and Hackbarth (2011) as liquid firms’ acquiring financially distressed firms which
would be otherwise ine ciently terminated. The M&A data are available from the paper’s
Table 1 at an yearly basis from 1980 to 2006. Both panels are supplemented by linear trend
lines. The OLS t-statistics of the slopes in Panel (a) and (b) are respectively 2.316 (p-value:
0.029) and  1.864 (p-value: 0.074).
(a) Total Number of M&A Activities
(b) Ratio of Liquidity Mergers
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and the number of days between announcement and completion ranges from zero to 1,000
days. Both panels are supplemented by linear trend lines.
The figure’s implications are consistent with the conventional wisdom. Panel (a) shows
that M&As are made more frequently when funding liquidity is high. Panel (b) shows
that liquidity mergers become more prevalent when funding liquidity is low. Note that,
under the circumstances of low funding liquidity, distressed firms are more likely to be
prematurely liquidated, and therefore liquidity mergers will be able to create higher profits.
Both relationships are statistically significant. The OLS t-statistics of the slopes in Panel
(a) and (b) are respectively 2.316 (p-value: 0.029) and  1.864 (p-value: 0.074). Thus, the
figure shows that funding liquidity a↵ects not only the frequency of mergers but also their
characteristic compositions.
One caution is that the figure is based on the average funding liquidity in the next year.
Thus, there is one-year time lag in the relations between fliq and M&A activities. Though
not reported here, fliq’s contemporary values also have the same signs, but their slopes are
not statistically significant. Two reasons can be accounted for the time lag. First, fliq’s
estimation is delayed due to a mechanical reason. Second, CEOs would have made M&A
decisions in the anticipation of future funding liquidity. These possibilities are essentially
equal to those which explain why fliq is lagging behind aggregate hedge fund leverage ratios
in Figure 4.
In a nutshell, this section estimates funding liquidity and describes its time series. Fund-
ing liquidity is shown to be exceptionally high in the beginning of recession but sharply
drop and reach to a bottom as recession comes to an end. fliq is positively correlated with
aggregate hedge fund leverage ratios and the total number of M&As, and negatively with
bond liquidity premiums, Moody’s Baa-Aaa spreads, and the relative prevalence of liquidity
mergers.
1.4 Forecast of Future Stock Market Returns
Section 1.2 provides a theoretical background about the measurement of funding liquidity.
The key idea is to use the di↵erence of market-return sensitivities of liquidity between small
and large stocks. As implied by Figure 2, the higher the di↵erence, a speculator would have
been less constrained by margin requirements. Based on the intuition, Section 1.3 estimates
the funding liquidity as the di↵erence of two rolling correlations, fliq ⌘ ⇢large   ⇢small, and
describes its time series.
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Now, Section 1.4 focuses on testing whether the estimated funding liquidity indeed has
the predictability of future stock market returns. In sum, the estimates of funding liquidity
show significant predictability by both in-sample and out-of-sample tests. The predictabil-
ity is robust to the small-sample predictive regression bias (Stambaugh, 1999; Nelson and
Kim, 1993) as well as to the long-horizon predictability bias (Boudoukh, Richardson, and
Whitelaw, 2007). The results are also robust to controlling for various equity premium
predictors such as valuation ratio, variance premium as the di↵erence between squared VIX
and realized stock return variance, Goyal and Santa-Clara (2003)’s average stock return
variance, Boudoukh, Michaely, Richardson, and Roberts (2007)’s total net payout yields,
Lettau and Ludvigson (2001)’s consumption-wealth ratio, and Pollet and Wilson (2010)’s
average correlation among individual stock returns. Moreover, the predictability appears
significant during each of the Bretten Woods System period (1946–1970), the pre-Volcker
period (1971–1985), and the post-Volcker period (1986–2010). Thus, the funding liquid-
ity’s predictability overcomes Goyal and Welch (2008, p.1456)’s critique that “any earlier
apparent statistical significance (of equity premium predictors) was often based exclusively
on years up to and especially on the years of the Oil Shock of 1973–1975.”
1.4.1 In-Sample Tests
Table 1 regresses future stock market excess returns on the rolling correlations. The de-
pendent variable is cumulative stock market excess returns over the next h months. The
independent variable, ⇢small (⇢large) denotes the rolling correlations between stock market
excess returns and small (large)-stock illiquidity over the preceding 30 months. Panel A
uses the two rolling correlations as predictors separately, and Panel B uses their di↵er-
ence, fliq ⌘ ⇢large   ⇢small, which is the measurement of funding liquidity in this paper.
Newey-West t-statistics with 12 lags are reported to control for the autocorrelation and
heteroskedasticity of dependent variables. This table adds the log of cyclically-adjusted
P/E ratio (CAPE)13 as a control variable.
The table shows that the rolling correlations predict future stock returns with strong
significance for all horizons. Interestingly, the correlations show opposite signs but their
magnitudes are close to each other. Moreover, as shown by the first column of Table 1
as well as later results in Table 2, and Table 6, the small stocks’ rolling correlation is
more significant than the large stocks’. These two patterns are consistent with the model’s
13CAPE valuation ratios are downloaded from Robert Shiller’s website.
http://www.econ.yale.edu/~shiller/data.htm
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Table 1: Rolling Correlations Predict Future Stock Market Returns
The dependent variable is cumulative stock market excess returns for the next h months. The excess
returns are collected from Kenneth French’s website, and the cumulative horizon is denoted on the
first row. The independent variable, ⇢small (⇢large) denotes the rolling correlations between stock
market excess returns and small (large)-stock illiquidity over the preceding 30 months. CAPE de-
notes cyclically-adjusted price/earnings ratios, which are downloaded from Robert Shiller’s website.
Numbers in parentheses are Newey-West t statistics with 12 lags. ***, **, and * denote significances
at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.
horizon 1 month 3 months 6 months 1 year
Panel A. Regression on Two Rolling Correlations
⇢small 3.268*** 9.660*** 18.021*** 34.062***
(3.720) (3.857) (3.961) (3.942)
⇢large -2.431*** -9.029*** -18.865*** -36.970***
(-2.874) (-3.725) (-4.323) (-5.049)
log(CAPE) -0.469 -1.368 -2.924 -6.072*
(-1.145) (-1.199) (-1.405) (-1.804)
obs 779 777 774 768
R2 0.020 0.059 0.109 0.206
Panel B. Regression on fliq ⌘ ⇢large   ⇢small
⇢large   ⇢small -2.931*** -9.407*** -18.358*** -35.210***
(-3.926) (-4.385) (-4.778) (-4.936)
log(CAPE) -0.419 -1.330 -2.976 -6.254*
(-1.073) (-1.205) (-1.451) (-1.869)
obs 779 777 774 768
R2 0.019 0.058 0.109 0.205
implication in Figure 2, which shows that small stocks’ correlation is higher on the left
meanwhile large stocks’ correlation is relatively flat but slightly higher on the right. Since
the figure’s horizontal axis corresponds funding liquidity and low funding liquidity predicts
high future returns, ⇢small comes to show positive predictability whereas ⇢large does negative
and less significant one.
The table also shows that R2 increases over predictability horizons. However, the in-
creases in R2 are likely to be spurious because the dependent variable becomes mechanically
autocorrelated as it is measured for overlapping periods. This type of spuriousness is called
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Table 2: Di↵erence of Rolling Correlations
The dependent variable is stock market excess returns in the next month. The independent variable,
⇢small (⇢large) denotes the rolling correlations between stock market excess returns and small (large)-
stock illiquidity over the preceding 30 months. CAPE denotes cyclically-adjusted price/earnings
ratios, which are downloaded from Robert Shiller’s website. This table is intended to show that
the di↵erence alone is able to capture the two rolling correlations’ forecastability. Numbers in
parentheses are Newey-West t statistics with 12 lags. ***, **, and * denote significances at 1%, 5%,
and 10% levels respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
⇢small 3.268*** 0.837 2.062**
(3.720) (0.892) (2.419)
⇢large -2.431*** 0.837 -0.492
(-2.874) (0.892) (-0.568)
⇢large   ⇢small -2.931*** -2.431*** -3.268***
(-3.926) (-2.874) (-3.720)
log(CAPE) -0.469 -0.419 -0.469 -0.469 -0.695* -0.634
(-1.145) (-1.073) (-1.145) (-1.145) (-1.662) (-1.447)
obs 779 779 779 779 779 779
R2 0.020 0.019 0.020 0.020 0.013 0.004
the long-horizon predictability bias. For instance, Boudoukh, Richardson, and Whitelaw
(2007, p.1577) test the bias and find that “R2’s are roughly proportional to the horizon
under the null hypothesis (of no predictability).” Thus, my recommendation is to take into
account only the one-month ahead prediction which is shown in the first column of this
table. Also, all following tables will report only the one-month ahead predictions.
Table 1 shows that the two rolling correlations have significant predictability. According
to the model, however, the predictability is expected to be summarized by the di↵erence
between them. The implication is supported by Table 1 with two facts. First, the two rolling
correlations’ coe cients in Panel A have opposite signs but almost equal in magnitudes.
Second, R2’s in Panel B are virtually equal to those in Panel A.
To test the implication more in detail, Table 2 uses di↵erent combinations of ⇢large,
⇢small, and fliq as predictors. The dependent variable is stock market excess returns in the
next month so that the results are not a↵ected by long-horizon forecast bias. Column (1)
and (2) of Table 2 are identical with the first column of Table 1.
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Table 2 shows, based on the R2’s in column (1) and (2), that fliq’s forecastability is
as powerful as the levels of the two rolling correlations combined. Moreover, as shown
by column (3) and (4), the di↵erence dominates the levels of rolling correlations in the
regression. Column (5) and (6) also show that ⇢large and ⇢small’s significance becomes far
weaker when a predictive regression is done on either one of them. Therefore, the table
implies that the two rolling correlations’ predictability largely comes from their di↵erence.
fliq’s sample standard deviation is 0.183. Thus, according to column (2) of the table,
one-standard-deviation-high fliq predicts the next monthly stock market return to be lower
by 0.536%. In comparison, the sample average of monthly stock market excess returns is
0.470%. Even though the R2 from the predictive regression is only 1.9%, the magnitude of
the prediction is quite substantial.
One may argue that fliq’s forecastability is probably attributed to some omitted factors.
Volatility-related equity premium predictors are particularly suspicious since volatility is
highly correlated to liquidity. To address this concern, Table 3 presents a horse-race test of
fliq’s forecastability along with other various equity premium predictors. In sum, the table
shows that fliq’s forecastability survives all of the horse-race tests with strong significance.
First, column (2) of the table controls for variance premium, which is measured as
the squared VIX index at the end of each month less the sample variance of daily stock
market returns in a given month. The latter is annualized by multiplying 252 to match
their scales. Variance premium is considered the best proxy of investors’ risk aversion and
known to be one of the strongest equity premium predictors.14 The decrease in the number
of observations is due to the availability of VIX data since the index was not available prior
to 1990. The column shows that fliq’s forecastability is significant even after controlling
for the variance premium.
Second, column (3) controls for market return and average stock variances. The two
variance factors’ forecastability is based on Goyal and Santa-Clara (2003),15 who find that
the variance of idiosyncratic risks is related to equity premiums in the stock market. They
argue that risks of non-tradable assets such as wages or family businesses are closely related
to the variance of idiosyncratic risks in the stock market, which is the reason why the risks
are priced by the market. Interestingly, market return variance is shown to have a negative
coe cient. Again, the column confirms the significance of fliq’s forecastability.
14Todorov (2009), Bollerslev and Todorov (2011), and Drechsler and Yaron (2011) provide a model to
explain the variance premium.
15I am grateful to Amit Goyal for sharing the average stock variance data.
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Table 3: Horse-Race Forecast Tests
The dependent variable is stock market excess returns in the next month. The explanatory variable,
⇢small (⇢large), denotes the rolling correlations between stock market excess returns and small (large)-
stock illiquidity over the preceding 30 months. The rest of the independent variables are to control
for other equity risk premium predictors. CAPE denotes cyclically-adjusted price/earnings ratios.
Variance premium is the di↵erence between squared VIX index and realized variance of stock returns.
Market return variance and average stock variance are provided by Goyal and Santa-Clara (2003),
who argue that idiosyncratic risks are priced by the stock market. Small-stock value spreads, provided
by Campbell and Vuolteenaho (2004), are the di↵erence in the log book-to-market ratios of small
value and small growth stocks. Total net payout yields, provided by Boudoukh, Michaely, Richardson,
and Roberts (2007), are the sum of dividend yields, share repurchases, and equity issuances. cay
denotes Lettau and Ludvigson (2001)’s consumption-wealth ratio, and average correlation denotes
Pollet and Wilson (2010)’s average correlation among individual stock returns. The last two control
variables are available at a quarterly basis, so quarterly market excess returns are used as a dependent
variable in column (8) to (10). The sample horizon is from January 1946 to December 2010, but
the number of observations varies depending on the availability of control variables. Numbers in
parentheses are Newey-West t statistics with 12 lags in column (1)–(7) and 4 lags in (8)–(10). ***,
**, and * denote significances at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
⇢large   ⇢small -2.931*** -2.782*** -3.077*** -2.598*** -2.638***
(-3.926) (-2.911) (-2.997) (-3.344) (-3.172)
log(CAPE) -0.419 -1.611* -0.741 -0.805* -0.311
(-1.073) (-1.829) (-1.457) (-1.878) (-0.652)
variance 28.826***
premium (4.915)
market return -0.014***
variance (-2.744)
average stock 0.005***
variance (3.689)
riskfree -1.862**
interest rate (-2.561)
small-stock -1.088
value spreads (-0.796)
obs 779 251 450 779 672
R2 0.019 0.077 0.035 0.029 0.017
continued on the next page
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Table 3: Horse-Race Forecast Tests (continued)
(6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
⇢large   ⇢small -3.067*** -3.134*** -8.250*** -8.417*** -7.415***
(-4.140) (-3.701) (-3.453) (-2.875) (-3.050)
log(CAPE) -0.255 -1.283 0.323 0.308
(-0.584) (-0.961) (0.243) (0.232)
Moody’s 0.345
Baa-Aaa spreads (0.662)
net payout 0.628
yields (0.874)
consumption-wealth 101.247*** 95.377***
ratio (cay) (3.050) (2.682)
average 23.328*** 22.507***
correlation (3.821) (3.591)
obs 779 708 234 176 176
R2 0.020 0.022 0.090 0.095 0.132
Table 3’s column (4) makes fliq compete with short-term risk-free interest rates, which
is considered one of the strongest equity premium predictors. For example, Ang and Bekaert
(2007, p.652) conclude that “the most robust predictive variable for future excess returns
is the short rate.” Henkel, Martin, and Nardari (2011, p.560) investigate the riskfree rates’
forecastability in relation to business cycle, and find that it is “non-existent during business
cycle expansions but sizable during contractions.” Once agin, even after controlling for the
short rate, fliq is still found to have a strong predictive power.
Column (5) controls for the small-stock value spread, which is defined as the di↵erence in
the log book-to-market ratios of small value and small growth stocks. Brennan, Wang, and
Xia (2001), Campbell and Vuolteenaho (2004), and Campbell, Polk, and Vuolteenaho (2009)
show that the spread is a significant predictor of equity premiums. Its data are downloaded
from Campbell and Vuolteenaho (2004)’s publication web page on the American Economic
Review,16 spanning from December 1928 to December 2001. The table shows that the
value spread’s forecastability is not significant during the post-war sample. However, fliq’s
forecastability is once again vindicated to be significant.
16http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/0002828043052240
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Moody’s Baa-Aaa corporate bond spreads17 are controlled for in column (6). Chen,
Roll, and Ross (1986) and Keim and Stambaugh (1986) show that the credit spreads are
informative of equity premiums. The credit spreads are also often used as a proxy of
funding liquidity in the bond market. In the table, however, the credit spreads fail to show
any significant predictability meanwhile fliq still remains significant.
Boudoukh, Michaely, Richardson, and Roberts (2007)’s total net payout yields are used
as a control variable in column (7). They argue that share repurchases and seasonal equity
o↵erings are as important as dividend payments, but the net equity issuance is not accounted
for by conventional equity premium predictors such as dividend yields or valuation ratios.
The authors show that total net payout yields, measured as dividend yields less net equity
issuances, outperform dividend yields as an equity premium predictor. The net payout
yields turn out to be not significant in column (7), however, since its forecastability is
largely owed to pre-war samples. In comparison, fliq’s forecastability is still significant.
Column (8) and (10) control for Lettau and Ludvigson (2001)’s consumption-wealth
ratio, which is one of the most popular predictors of equity premiums. They measure
consumption, asset holdings and labor income from quarterly data, and show that the
deviation from their cointegration has important predictive information of future stock
returns. The deviation is designated as the consumption-wealth ratio. The ratio is available
on a quarterly bsis, so the dependent variable is replaced by quarter excess returns in the
last three columns. It is why fliq’s coe cients are almost three times bigger than those in
previous columns. Again, fliq’s forecastability turns out to be robust to the consumption-
wealth ratio.
Lastly, column (9) and (10) control for Pollet and Wilson (2010)’s average correlation
among individual stock returns18. Pollet and Wilson (2010) separate the variances of stock
market returns into two components–average variances and correlations of individual stock
returns–and show that the correlation component has significant forecastability of future
stock market excess returns. Thanks to its forecasting power, R2 shows a notable increase
from 9.0% in column (8) to 13.2% in column (10). Once again, fliq’s forecastability is yet
subsumed.
Polk, Thompson, and Vuolteenaho (2006) show that the di↵erence of cross-sectional
CAPM betas between value and growth stocks is able to predict future stock market returns.
The cross-sectional beta premium also appears negatively correlated with the S&P500’s
17http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/categories/119
18I am grateful to Joshua Pollet for sharing the average correlation data.
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valuation multiples, implying that it is related to the market price of risk in the stock
market. However, the beta premium’s forecastability is mostly found from the pre-1965
subsample only, so are the market valuation multiples. In contrast, as will be shown by
Section 1.4.4 and Table 6, fliq’s forecastability is significant during the post-war sample
but becomes insignificant prior to 1945. Thus, I pass over the replication of estimating the
beta premium as a control variable.
1.4.2 Out-of-Sample Tests
In-sample tests are not strong enough to convince predictability because their results are
likely to be spurious for various reasons.19 In contrast, out-of-sample tests, which have
been a new norm of predictability tests since the seminal work by Meese and Rogo↵ (1983),
are immune to the biases. Moreover, out-of-sample tests require higher standard of pre-
dictability than in-sample tests because the parameter of a predictor itself is estimated
with noise. “Excluding some variables that truly belong in the model could adversely a↵ect
forecast accuracy. Yet including the variables could raise the forecast error variance if the
associated parameters are estimated su ciently imprecisely,” explain Clark and McCracken
(2011, p.1).
To show fliq’s forecastability in the out-of-sample test, three models–one restricted and
two unrestricted–are specified as follows
Model 1 (restricted) : exrett+1 = µ+ ✏t+1 (19)
Model 2A (unrestricted) : exrett+1 = µ+  1 ⇢small +  2 ⇢large + ✏t+1 (20)
Model 2B (unrestricted) : exrett+1 = µ+   (⇢small   ⇢large) + ✏t+1 (21)
The restricted model does not have any predictor meanwhile the unrestricted models have
the rolling correlations and their di↵erence as predictors. The null hypothesis is the equal
forecastability, which implies that the unrestricted models cannot improve forecastability
over the restricted model. Table 4 compares the three models’ out-of-sample forecastability.
Its Panel A compares Model 1’s forecastability with Model 2A’s, and Panel B compares
Model 1’s with Model 2B’s.
The critical values of the out-of-sample test statistics are di↵erent depending on the
19For example, if some values are regressed on any random walk variable, its t-statistics tend to be
statistically significant even though they don’t have any relationship. However, out-of-sample tests are not
subject to this problem.
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Table 4: Out-of-Sample Predictability
This table tests the out-of-sample predictabilities of the rolling correlations. The dependent variable
is stock market excess returns in the next month. The restricted model uses only a constant term,
assuming that stock market returns are not predictable. The unrestricted model uses the two rolling
correlations in Panel A, and their di↵erence in Panel B. The sample data span Jul 1955 to Dec 2010.
The initial periods of in-sample observations are shown in the first column. RMSE1 and RMSE2
denote the root mean squared errors of the restricted and unrestricted models. R2 is computed
as R2 = 1    RMSE2RMSE1 2. ENC-T, ENC-REG and ENC-NEW show the test statistics of equal
forecastability based on Diebold and Mariano (2002), Ericsson (1992) and Clark and McCracken
(2001) respectively. ** and * denote significances at 5% and 10% levels.
# in-sample # predictions RMSE1 RMSE2 R2 ENC-T ENC-REG ENC-NEW
Panel A. Prediction with ⇢small and ⇢large
⇠ Dec 2005 Jan 2006 ⇠ 5.431 5.348 0.030 1.30* 1.36* 1.60**
⇠ Dec 2001 Jan 2002 ⇠ 4.807 4.729 0.032 1.71** 1.94** 2.87**
⇠ Jul 1995 Aug 1995 ⇠ 4.873 4.812 0.025 1.81** 2.15** 4.51**
⇠ Feb 1984 Mar 1984 ⇠ 4.625 4.595 0.013 1.87** 2.13** 5.68**
⇠ Mar 1975 Apr 1975 ⇠ 4.579 4.559 0.008 1.93** 2.12** 6.40**
⇠ Sep 1970 Oct 1970 ⇠ 4.664 4.634 0.013 2.27** 2.55** 8.06**
⇠ Apr 1966 May 1967 ⇠ 4.649 4.622 0.011 2.27** 2.56** 8.17**
Panel B. Prediction with ⇢small   ⇢large
⇠ Dec 2005 Jan 2006 ⇠ 5.431 5.347 0.030 1.58** 1.40* 1.48**
⇠ Dec 2001 Jan 2002 ⇠ 4.807 4.729 0.032 2.04** 1.97** 2.73**
⇠ Jul 1995 Aug 1995 ⇠ 4.873 4.812 0.025 1.91** 2.17** 4.48**
⇠ Feb 1984 Mar 1984 ⇠ 4.625 4.593 0.014 2.01** 2.18** 5.81**
⇠ Mar 1975 Apr 1975 ⇠ 4.579 4.557 0.010 2.09** 2.19** 6.66**
⇠ Sep 1970 Oct 1970 ⇠ 4.664 4.630 0.015 2.51** 2.71** 8.60**
⇠ Apr 1966 May 1967 ⇠ 4.649 4.618 0.013 2.50** 2.71** 8.73**
ratio of the number of initial in-sample observations (R) to the number of out-of-sample
forecast observations (P ). Clark and McCracken (2001) provide the critical values for
⇡ ⌘ P/R = 0.1, 0.2, 0.4, 1.0, 2.0, 3.0 and 5.0. I divide my samples according to each
value of ⇡ and compute the statistical significances of the out-of-sample tests. Each row of
Table 4 corresponds to one of the provided ⇡’s.
Out-of-sample forecast errors are estimated as:
✏ˆt+1 = exrett+1    ˆ>(t 1)xt (22)
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where  ˆ(t 1) denotes the regression coe cients estimated from the first t  1 observations,
and xt is a column vector of predictors at time t. RMSE1 and RMSE2 denote the root
mean squared errors from the restricted and unrestricted models.
RMSE =
vuut 1
R
P+RX
t=P+1
(✏ˆt+1)
2 (23)
R2 is computed as
R2 = 1 
✓
RMSE2
RMSE1
◆2
(24)
R2 is supposed to be positive if the unrestricted models improve forecastability over the
restricted model. The table reports three test statistics (ENC-T, ENC-REG and ENC-
NEW), each of which is based on Diebold and Mariano (2002), Ericsson (1992) and Clark
and McCracken (2001) respectively.20
Table 4 shows that RMSE2 is smaller than RMSE1 in all cases. R2’s vary from 0.8%
to 3.0%, which are consistent with the R2 of 1.9% from the in-sample tests of Table 1 and
2. Furthermore, all test statistics reject the null hypothesis of equal forecastability. Only
3 out of 42 statistics are significant at 10% level, and the rest are significant at 5% level.
Therefore, the out-of-sample test confirms that fliq has significant forecastability of future
stock market excess returns.
1.4.3 Profit & Loss of Trading Strategies Based on Funding Liquidity
This subsection derives simple market-timing trading strategies based on fliq’s forecasta-
bility and computes their tallies of profit and loss. This approach kills two birds with one
stone. First, it augments out-of-sample forecastability. Second, it tests if the estimated
funding liquidity is practically deployable.
The strategies are designed as follows. Suppose, at the end of each month t, an investor
estimates the percentile of the current fliq based on its past histories.
xt = p (fliq  fliqt | fliq1, · · · , f liqt 1)
=
1
t  1
t 1X
s=1
I {fliqs  fliqt} (25)
20“ENC” means that the unrestricted model encompasses the restricted one. I follow the notations of
Clark and McCracken (2001).
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Table 5: Profitability of Trading Strategies
This table compares profitability of trading strategies based on the funding liquidity’s forecastability.
They are simple market-timing strategies balancing between risk-free assets and stock market index
funds. The weights on the stock market funds are given as
✓t = ✓¯   xt
 
✓¯   ✓  2 ⇥ ✓, ✓¯ ⇤
where xt denotes the percentile of today’s funding liquidity based on its history.
xt = p (fliq  fliqt | fliq1, · · · , f liqt 1) = 1
t  1
t 1X
s=1
I {fliqs  fliqt}
where fliq denotes the funding liquidity, which is estimated as the di↵erence of two rolling corre-
lations. The lowest and highest stock weights, ✓ and ✓¯, are specified by the figure’s legends. All
strategies are assumed to start with a seed money of $100 at the end of December 1969 and come
to an end in December 2010.
Stocks Only risk-free Only Strategy 1 Strategy 2 Strategy 3
✓ = 1 ✓ = 0 ✓ 2 [0, 1] ✓ 2 [0, 2] ✓ 2 [ 1, 2]
Panel A. Portfolio Holding Returns (Rp,t+1)
average 0.908 0.452 0.856 1.259 1.206
stdev 4.685 0.253 2.272 4.545 4.431
Panel B. Portfolio Excess Returns (Rp,t+1  Rf,t)
average 0.456 0 0.404 0.807 0.754
stdev 4.696 0 2.279 4.559 4.437
Sharpe Ratio 0.097 . 0.177 0.177 0.170
where fliq denotes the funding liquidity, which is estimated as the di↵erence of two rolling
correlations. His investment portfolio consists of risk-free assets and stock market index
funds. He adjusts the weight of stocks based on the percentile (xt) as
✓t = ✓¯   xt
 
✓¯   ✓  2 ⇥ ✓, ✓¯ ⇤ (26)
The investor would put ✓¯ of his wealth in stocks and 1  ✓¯ in bonds if the current fliq is the
lowest compared to its past history (fliq1, · · · , f liqt 1), or ✓ in stocks and 1  ✓ in bonds if
the current fliq is the highest. In general, his portfolio return in the next month would be
given as
Rp,t+1 = ✓t (Rm,t+1  Rf,t) +Rf,t (27)
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Table 5 compares profitabilities of the trading strategy depending on the ranges of
portfolio weights,
⇥
✓, ✓¯
⇤
. The first two columns are benchmarks. The first one always holds
stock market index funds only (✓ = 1), and the second one holds only risk-free assets (✓ = 0).
Strategy 1 is placed in between of these two benchmarks (✓ 2 [0, 1]). Strategy 2 sometimes
borrows from risk-free assets and leverages up stock holdings (✓ 2 [0, 2]). Strategy 3 is
even more aggressive than Strategy 2, switching between long and short positions of stock
markets (✓ 2 [ 1, 2]).
All three strategies of Table 5 achieve almost twice as high Sharpe ratios as the bench-
mark stock-only portfolio (0.177/0.097 ⇡ 1.82). Strategy 1 shows similar average returns
with the benchmark, but it could halve the standard deviation of its excess returns. In com-
parison, Strategy 2 and 3 double average returns while keeping their standard deviations in
tandem with the benchmark’s.
Portfolio adjustment costs are not considered since both risk-free assets and stock market
index funds have high liquidity. For a robustness check, I varied the starting date of portfolio
formation and found similar results.
1.4.4 Predictability in Subsamples
One concern in the literature of equity premium predictors is that forecastability of many
predictors is limited to specific periods. Goyal and Welch (2008, p.1456) comprehensively
survey dozens of di↵erent predictors and find that “for many models, any earlier apparent
statistical significance was often based exclusively on years up to and especially on the years
of the Oil Shock of 1973–1975.” In particular, most models are found to perform poorly
in recent years. The concern naturally raises a question about how fliq’s forecastability
changes over subsample periods.
Table 6 compares fliq’s forecastability in subsamples. The first column covers entire
sample periods available from CRSP (1928–2010). The second and third columns separate
samples based on the second world war. The last three columns divide the post-war periods
into three subsamples based on the Bretten Woods System and the Volcker regime.
The table shows that fliq has significant forecastability during the post-war periods. Its
forecastability is not weakened even after the Volcker regime. Thus, fliq overcomes Goyal
and Welch (2008)’s critique that many predictors’ forecastability is limited to the Oil Shock
periods of 1973–1975. However, fliq shows weaker predictability during the Bretten Woods
System periods, and even fails to show any significance prior to the second world war. In
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Table 6: Predictability in Subsamples
The dependent variable is stock market excess returns in the next month. The independent variable,
⇢small (⇢large) denotes the rolling correlations between stock market excess returns and small (large)-
stock illiquidity over the preceding 30 months. Subsample periods are specified in the first row.
CAPE denotes cyclically-adjusted price/earnings ratios, which are downloaded from Robert Shiller’s
website. Numbers in parentheses are Newey-West t statistics with 12 lags. ***, **, and * denote
significances at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.
sample All Pre-WW2 Post-WW2 Bretten Woods Pre-Volcker Post-Volcker
periods 1928 ⇠ 2010 1928 ⇠ 1945 1946 ⇠ 2010 1946 ⇠ 1970 1971 ⇠ 1985 1986 ⇠ 2010
Panel A. Regression on Two Rolling Correlations
⇢small 2.691** 2.532 3.268*** 2.562* 4.329*** 4.598***
(2.415) (0.686) (3.720) (1.686) (2.991) (3.304)
⇢large -1.181 -3.011 -2.431*** -2.172 -1.980 -1.519
(-1.024) (-0.667) (-2.874) (-1.345) (-1.038) (-1.274)
log(CAPE) -1.366** -6.283*** -0.469 -1.875** -2.174 -1.701**
(-2.441) (-2.752) (-1.145) (-2.450) (-1.587) (-2.378)
obs 984 205 779 300 180 299
R2 0.018 0.053 0.020 0.024 0.046 0.034
Panel B. Regression on fliq ⌘ ⇢large   ⇢small
⇢large   ⇢small -2.042* -2.610 -2.931*** -2.423* -3.639*** -3.193***
(-1.918) (-0.708) (-3.926) (-1.688) (-2.841) (-3.019)
log(CAPE) -1.348** -6.184*** -0.419 -1.807** -2.269 -0.943
(-2.387) (-2.944) (-1.073) (-2.501) (-1.608) (-1.392)
obs 984 205 779 300 180 299
R2 0.016 0.053 0.019 0.023 0.041 0.026
contrast, the log valuation ratio shows significant forecastability prior to 1970, but fails to
do so thereafter.
There are several possible explanations about why fliq’s forecastability weakens during
the early sample periods. The first candidate is the qualitative di↵erence of the financial
system before and after the World War 2. For example, Schularick and Taylor (2009)
show that the money and credit aggregates had been tightly tied until 1939 but the credit
aggregates “started to decouple from the broad money and grew rapidly, via a combination
of increased leverage and augmented funding via the non-monetary liabilities of banks”
since 1945. Given that funding liquidity is the important determinant of the non-monetary
liabilities, the lack of forecastability from the pre-war sample is consistent with the paper’s
33
Figure 7: fliq Estimated Over Various Horizons
This figure compares funding liquidity estimated over di↵erent rolling window horizons. The blue
dashed line is estimated over the past 12 months meanwhile the red solid line is over 30 months.
For reference, fliq has been estimated over the past 30 months so far.
findings. Second, trading volume data in the early samples may not be as accurate as recent
data, thus the estimated Amihud illiquidity measure might have been corrupted by higher
noises.
1.4.5 fliq Estimated Over Various Rolling Window Horizons
In previous tests, fliq has been estimated over the preceding 30 months. Now, one may
ask whether fliq’s estimation horizon a↵ects the results. Given that the e↵ects of capital
constraints on asset liquidity are often considered weekly or daily frequency phenomena,
the 30-month rolling window horizon seems to be excessively long. For example, Hameed,
Kang, and Viswanathan (2010) show that negative stock market returns raise stock bid-ask
spreads and these changes in liquidity last for about two weeks. Moreover, Figure 4 and
Figure 6 also indicate that fliq is lagging behind the aggregate hedge fund leverage ratios
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and the M&A activities by about one year. Provided the facts, one can feel urge to estimate
funding liquidity over shorter horizons with high-frequency data. Due to the lack of access
to high-frequency data, however, this possibility could not have been tested yet.
Figure 7 compares two versions of fliq. The red solid line is estimated over the past
30-month window, and the blue dashed line is estimated over the past 12 months. The
figure shows that fliq’s estimates are likely to be blighted by noises when estimated from
a small number of observations. Although not reported, fliq’s forecastability also vanishes
when it is estimated over the 12-month window.
1.4.6 Funding Liquidity Estimated from Volatility Quintile Portfolios
The model’s bottom line is that low funding liquify makes speculators withdraw first from
small and more volatile stocks due to their high margin requirements. Thus, portfolio
formation not only based on size but also on volatility is expected to yield similar results.
To test the implication, this section estimates each stock’s volatility as a standard deviation
of daily stock returns every month, forms quintile portfolios based on the volatility, computes
equal-weighted averages of Amihud measure for each portfolio, and estimates their rolling
correlations to stock market excess returns over the preceding 30 months. Volatility-based
funding liquidity is defined as fliqv ⌘ ⇢least volatile   ⇢most volatile. Table 7 tests fliqv’s
predictability for the forecast horizons of 1 to 12 months, which are specified on the table’s
first row.
As expected, fliqv shows significant forecastability. The signs of two rolling correlations
are also consistent with previous results. However, the volatility-based fliqv’s statistical
significance is not as strong as the size-based fliq’s. For example, the Newey-West t statis-
tics drops from  3.926 for fliq (Table 2) to -1.839 for fliqv (Table 7). fliqv’s weakened
significance is largely due to the fact that ⇢least volatile loses most of its predictability relative
to ⇢large. Panel A shows that ⇢least volatile’s predictability (t statistics:  0.979 for 1 month
to  2.408 for 12 months) is far weaker than ⇢large’s in Table 1 (t statistics:  2.874 for 1
month to  5.049 for 12 months).
fliqv underperforms the original fliq since the industry charges margin requirements
not based on volatility but by stock size. Large stocks’ margins are usually 50% meanwhile
small stocks are not accepted as collaterals on many occasions.
For a robustness, I also measure individual stock return volatility every year rather than
a month and rebalance quintile portfolios at an annual basis. Though not reported here,
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Table 7: Rolling Correlations Estimated from Volatility Quintile Portfolios
In the table, stock portfolios are formed not based on firm size but on stock return volatility.
Rolling correlations are estimated between stock market excess returns and each volatility-quintile
portfolio’s asset illiquidity over the preceding 30 months. Forecast horizons are denoted on the first
row. CAPE denotes cyclically-adjusted price/earnings ratios, which are downloaded from Robert
Shiller’s website. Numbers in parentheses are Newey-West t statistics with 12 lags. ***, **, and *
denote significances at 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively.
horizon 1 month 3 months 6 months 1 year
Panel A. Regression on Two Rolling Correlations
⇢most volatile 2.180** 6.471*** 10.126** 17.804**
(2.403) (2.631) (2.280) (2.180)
⇢least volatile -0.607 -2.691* -5.522** -11.512**
(-0.979) (-1.690) (-2.029) (-2.408)
log(CAPE) -0.768* -2.473* -5.159** -10.471**
(-1.757) (-1.952) (-2.148) (-2.548)
obs 779 777 774 768
R2 0.013 0.039 0.062 0.117
Panel B. Regression on fliq ⌘ ⇢large   ⇢small
⇢least volatile   ⇢most volatile -1.076* -3.818** -6.895*** -13.385***
(-1.839) (-2.522) (-2.674) (-2.831)
log(CAPE) -0.760* -2.455* -5.136** -10.441**
(-1.744) (-1.932) (-2.128) (-2.533)
obs 779 777 774 768
R2 0.009 0.032 0.058 0.113
the results are almost the same but slightly less significant than those in the table.
1.5 Conclusion
There are plenty of anecdotes in which risky assets become hugely discounted during a
liquidity crisis. As early as in the Asian currency crisis, many public and private firms
were sold to foreign enterprises at fire-sale prices. As recently as this draft is being written,
Greece is repeating the fire-sale privatizations to raise cash in hurry.
Thus, the conventional wisdom implies that liquidity crisis would be followed by high
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returns from risky assets. However, very few papers have been able to provide clear evidence
that liquidity is able to predict stock market returns. The answer to the puzzle lies in the
distinction of the two di↵erent types of liquidity: asset liquidity and funding liquidity. The
up-to-date evidence of liquidity’s risk premiums has been found from the cross-sectional
abnormal returns of stock portfolios, which is the risk premiums of asset liquidity. In
contrast, a general consensus has yet been made with regard to the funding liquidity.
This paper suggests a new way to estimate funding liquidity based on the theoretical
framework of Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009). When a speculator loses capital and be-
comes financially constrained, he would withdraw first from small stocks and then from large
stocks since large stocks demand lower margin requirements than small stocks. Therefore,
an exogenous shock to the speculator’s capital would a↵ect both assets’ liquidity when he
is rich enough to participate in trading both assets. However, the shock would a↵ect only
the large stocks’ liquidity if he was so poor that he completely withdrew from small stocks.
The sensitivities of asset liquidity to the capital shock vary depending on the speculator’s
own capital relative to margin requirements, which is the definition of funding liquidity.
Based on the intuition, funding liquidity is estimated by the rolling correlations of
stock market returns with small and large stocks’ liquidity. The estimated funding liquidity
appears positively correlated with aggregate hedge fund leverage ratios and the total number
of M&A activities, and negatively correlated with bond liquidity premiums and Moody’s
Baa-Aaa corporate bond spreads. Also, the funding liquidity is shown to forecast aggregate
stock market returns with strong significance both in in-sample and out-of-sample tests.
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2 Treasury Bill Yields: Overlooked Information
2.1 Introduction
Bond yields are the sum of two components: the averages of expected future riskfree short
interest rates and risk premiums.21 Thus, a change in risk premiums can be expected to
a↵ect bond yields. However, the recent literature has found the opposite; risk premiums in
the Treasury bond market do not appear to a↵ect the shapes of yield curves. For example,
Cochrane and Piazzesi (2005) conclude that “the return-forecasting factor is clearly not
related to any of the first three principal components,” although the first three principal
components are responsible for more than 99.9% of total variation of yield curves. Ludvigson
and Ng (2009) and Huang and Shi (2009) show that macroeconomic variables are informative
of bond risk premiums but the information is not spanned by bond yields.
The puzzle can be explained by the negative correlation between risk premiums and
expected future short-term interest rates. Suppose, for example, a circumstance in which
investors become more risk averse and expect the short-term interest rate to decrease in
the future. If the increase in risk premiums is o↵set by the decrease in expected future
short-term interest rates, the circumstance would not a↵ect bond yields. In other words,
the activity is hidden from yield curves.
The existence of the ‘hidden factor’ has been the central theme of the latest term struc-
ture literature. For example, Joslin, Priebsch, and Singleton (2010) incorporate macroeco-
nomic variables–inflation and real economic growth–into an a ne term structure model and
show that the macro risk premiums are not spanned by bond yields. Chernov and Mueller
(2011) show that the hidden factor “a↵ects inflation expectations at all horizons, but has
almost no e↵ect on the nominal yields.” Du↵ee (2011) estimates bond risk premiums using
the five-factor Kalman filtering method and shows that around one-half of the premiums
are hidden from yield curves.
This paper seeks to add to this literature. The argument is that the hidden factor
appears to be hidden due to its very short half-life. It could be the case that the increase in
risk premiums and the decrease in short-term interest rates were almost, but not completely,
o↵set. Based on the argument, one can also expect that Treasury bill yields might have
unique risk premium information that is not spanned by Treasury bonds, which is the main
finding of the paper.
21Equation (31) of the next section shows the composition of bond yields.
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This argument is actually the opposite of conventional wisdom that long-term maturity
bond yields are more informative of bond risk premiums than bond yields of short-term
maturity. For example, a permanent shock to bond risk premiums, if any, would raise
the slope of a yield curve since long-term yields have higher sensitivity to risk premiums.
However, short-term interest rates are insensitive to an increase in risk premiums since they
are considered risk-free by definition. This is the rationale behind Fama and Bliss (1987) and
Campbell and Shiller’s (1991) findings that the excess returns of holding long-term Treasury
bonds over short-term interest rates can be predicted by the slope of a yield curve. Kim and
Wright (2005) conclude that the decline of long-term yields despite an increase in the federal
funds target rate by 225 basis points from June 2004 to July 200522 is largely attributed to
a fall in risk premiums. Buraschi and Jiltsov (2005) develop a structural monetary version
of a real business cycle model and find that inflation risk premiums increase over maturity.
Many papers in the literature of bond risk premiums have not examined the impor-
tance of Treasury bills since their methodology is based on the annual excess returns of
holding long-term Treasury bonds over one-year risk-free interest rates. Treasury bills are
not considered by construction. Moreover, the qualitative di↵erence between annual and
monthly excess returns has not been seriously examined either. The findings of the current
paper show that monthly excess returns are more volatile than annual returns and have
higher Sharpe ratios. The monthly excess returns are driven by the two factors of di↵erent
frequencies–long term and short term–while the annual excess returns appear to ignore the
short-term factor.
Bond risk premiums consist of two factors: one long term and the other short term. The
long-term factor raises the slope of a yield curve, while the short-term factor is hidden from
Treasury bond yields but pulls down the yields of Treasury bills. The long-term factor is able
to predict excess returns over the horizon of even longer than one year, while the short-term
factor loses its predictability in one quarter. The two factors also have di↵erent economic
implications. The long-term factor predicts future economic growth, and the short-term
factor is closely related to bond liquidity premiums. In addition, the long-term factor is
related to value, size, and momentum premiums in the stock market and the short-term
factor is related to stock market returns.
This is not the first paper examining the di↵erences between Treasury bonds and Trea-
22This phenomenon is often cited as Greenspan’s conundrum because of his testimony in 2005 that “in
the current episode, however, the more-distant forward rates declined at the same time that short-term
rates were rising. Indeed, the tenth-year tranche, which yielded 6-1/2 percent last June, is now at about
5-1/4 percent. · · · For the moment, the broadly unanticipated behavior of world bond markets remains a
conundrum.”
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sury bills. For example, Du↵ee (1996) documents their market segmentation by using the
correlations of their yields. Pearson and Sun (1994), who estimate a two-factor Cox, Inger-
soll, and Ross (1985) term structure model, also conclude that “estimates based on only bills
imply unreasonably large price errors for longer maturities.” However, there has been no
precedent that compares Treasury-bonds with Treasury-bills in terms of the informativeness
of risk premiums.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 explains the estimation of
state variables from bond yields and inflation. Section 2.3 compares the forecastability
di↵erences between long- and short-term risk premium factors. Section 2.4 shows how
the two risk premium factors are related to the principal components of bond yields and,
in particular, why bond risk premiums seem to be unrelated to the first three principal
components–level, slope, and curvature. Section 2.5 compares the risk premium factors to
other financial market variables such as liquidity and stock market risk premiums. Section
2.6 discusses how the state variables are related to macroeconomic growth. Section 2.7
concludes.
2.2 Estimation of State Variables
2.2.1 What is Implied by Bond Yields
Let p(n)t denote the log price of an n-period maturity discount bond at time t. Its continu-
ously compounded bond yield is derived as
y(n)t =  
1
n
p(n)t (28)
where y(1)t = rt, the one-period risk-free interest rate.
The excess return of holding n-period maturity bonds from time t for h periods is defined
as its holding return less the h-period risk-free interest rate.
exr(n)t,t+h =
n
p(n h)t+h   p(n)t
o
 
n
0  p(h)t
o
=  (n  h) y(n h)t+h + n y(n)t   h y(h)t (29)
40
For a unit holding period, h = 1, the above equation can be turned into
n y(n)t = rt + (n  1) y(n 1)t+1 + exr(n)t+1
= rt +
n
rt+1 + (n  2) y(n 2)t+2 + exr(n 1)t+2
o
+ exr(n)t+1
= · · ·
=
n 1X
i=0
rt+i +
n 2X
i=0
exr(n i)t+i+1 (30)
Therefore,
) y(n)t =
1
n
Et
"
n 1X
i=0
rt+i
#
+
1
n
Et
"
n 2X
i=0
exr(n i)t+i+1
#
(31)
This equation implies that bond yields are essentially the sum of two components: the
averages of expected future short rates (rt+i) and excess returns (exrt+i). Now the question
is how to turn bond yields into the two components, which is the main theme of the following
two subsections. Section 2.2.2 separates the former component–the average of expected
future short rates–into a persistent part of core inflation and a transitory deviation of one-
year bond yields. Section 2.2.3 shows that the latter one–the average of expected future
excess returns–consists of two risk premium state variables with di↵erent frequencies. The
long-term risk premium state variable has the half-life of about 6 months meanwhile the
short-term risk premium’s half life is even less than one month.
2.2.2 Decomposition of Short Interest Rates (rt+i)
It is known that short interest rates do not revert to a constant mean. Instead, their
mean reversion seems to be toward a time-varying expected value. For example, Fama
(2006) concludes that the “mean reversion is toward a non-stationary (permanent) long-
term mean.”
The above finding implies that at least two state variables are needed to model the
dynamics of short interest rates: one needs to be persistent and the other transitory. In
fact, the literature has long assumed, either explicitly or implicitly, that short interest rates
consist of multiple components with di↵erent frequencies. For example, in almost all multi-
factor term structure models with at least a level and a slope factor, such as Rudebusch
and Wu (2008), short interest rates are implicitly assumed to be driven by persistent and
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transitory components. The level factor usually appears as persistent as a unit-root process
as opposed to the slope factor being a stationary mean-reverting variable. Other examples
include Campbell, Sunderam, and Viceira (2009), who explicitly model that nominal short
interest rates are composed of three components: permanent inflation, transitory inflation,
and transitory real interest rate.
The literature suggests that the persistent component of short interest rates is primar-
ily determined by the long-run mean of inflation (Kozicki and Tinsley, 2001; Gu¨rkaynak,
Sack, and Swanson, 2005; Atkeson and Kehoe, 2009; Goodfriend and King, 2009). Thus,
I estimate the persistent component using the history of realized core inflation, and the
transitory component as the residuals from regressing 1-year Treasury bond yields on the
persistent component of inflation. This estimation strategy is borrowed from Cieslak and
Povala (2011).
The persistent component (⌧t) is estimated as an exponentially-weighted average of
realized core inflation over the past 10 years:
⌧t ⌘
P120
i=0 v
iCPIt iP120
i=0 v
i
(32)
where (1   v) denotes the constant gain. Cieslak and Povala (2011) estimate the gain
parameter at v = 0.9868 (standard error 0.0025) by comparing the realized inflation with
inflation survey forecasts.
Figure 8’s top panel shows the time series of the estimated persistent component of
inflation. Core inflation data are downloaded from the FRED database.23 The estimated
series start in January 1968 since the database provides core inflation since January 1958 and
10-year histories are used to estimate the variable. According to the figure, the inflation
component reached the peak in the early 1980s and has gradually declined since then.
Cieslak and Povala (2011) conduct the augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test to see whether
the persistent inflation has a unit root. The test does not reject the null hypothesis for the
persistent inflation of being a unit-root process.
Given the persistent component of inflation, the transitory component can be estimated
as the deviations of short interest rates from the persistent component. One concern is how
to define the riskfree short interest rates. Note that T-bond yields are considered riskfree
only if their maturities are equal to investors’ holding periods; otherwise, investments in T-
bonds would have been exposed to the interest rate risk. One of possible candidates of short
23http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/CPILFESL?cid=32424
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Figure 8: Decomposition of risk-free Short Interest Rates
This figure decomposes one-year Treasury bond yields into two components: one is persis-
tent and the other is transitory. The persistent component is estimated as an exponentially-
weighted average of realized core inflation over the past 10 years, and the transitory com-
ponent as the residuals from the regression of one-year yields on the persistent inflation.
Shaded areas denote NBER recessions. Details can be found in Section 2.2.2.
(a) Persistent Inflation (⌧t)
(b) Transitory Short Rates ( t)
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interest rates is one-month T-bill yields since monthly observations of bond yields are used
as sample data. However, in the literature of risk premiums in the bond market, most papers
focus on annual excess returns and thus consider one-year T-bond yields riskfree interest
rates (Fama and Bliss, 1987; Cochrane and Piazzesi, 2005; Cochrane and Piazzesi, 2008;
Ludvigson and Ng, 2009; Cieslak and Povala, 2011). Following the literature, therefore, this
paper also uses one-year T-bond yields as a proxy of riskfree short interest rates.
Provided that short interest rates are determined by two components, the transitory one
can be estimated as the residuals of short interest rates orthogonalized by the persistent
component. Fama-Bliss one-year bond yields (y(1y)t , available from CRSP) are used as a
proxy of riskfree short interest rates.
y(1y)t =  0 +  1 ⌧t + ✏t (33)
 t ⌘ y(1y)t    ˆ0    ˆ1 ⌧t (34)
where  t denotes the transitory deviation of short interest rates from the persistent com-
ponent of inflation. Equation (33) describes the unobservable true model of short interest
rates and their two components, and  ˆ0 and  ˆ1 in Equation (34) denote its OLS coe cients.
The bottom panel of Figure 8 shows the time series of the transitory component, which
covaries with business cycles. It reaches its peaks in the beginning of recession and then
drops sharply as recession comes to an end. This pattern is consistent with conventional
monetary policy that lowers the Federal funds rate during recession.
2.2.3 Decomposition of Risk Premiums (Et [exrt+i])
Risk premiums can be defined as expected excess returns of risky assets. The early literature
of risk premiums in the bond market, such as Campbell and Shiller (1991) and Dai and
Singleton (2002), shows that the excess returns are predictable, and this finding has two
implications. First, it rejects the expectations hypothesis that forward interest rates are
equal to expected future short rates.24 Second, it also implies that the market price of
risk is time-varying and spanned by observable variables. For example, Fama and Bliss
(1987) and Cochrane and Piazzesi (2005) show that the time-varying market price of risk
can be projected on the cross-section of forward interest rates. Meanwhile, Ludvigson and
Ng (2009) and Huang and Shi (2009) find that the principal components of macroeconomic
24Piazzesi (2003) explains the rejection of the expectations hypothesis in detail.
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variables have unique information of risk premiums that is orthogonal to forward interest
rates.
As equation (31) implies, bond yields are the sum of averages of expected future short
interest rates and excess returns. By definition, short interest rates have zero risk premium
whereas expected excess returns are proportional to risk premiums. Thus, one can expect
that long-term bond yields would be more informative of risk premiums than short-term
yields.
To put it di↵erently, however, equation (31) also implies that short-term bond yields
probably have unique risk premium information that is not spanned by long-term yields. For
example, suppose that risk premiums consist of two state variables of di↵erent frequencies.
exrt+1 = b0 + b1 rplt + b2 rpst + ✏t+1 (35)
where rplt and rpst denote long- and short-term risk premiums. For simplicity, assume
that their mean values are zero. Note that the time-t expectation of future excess returns
is derived as
Et [exrt+s+1] = b0 + b1Et[ rplt+s ] + b2Et[ rpst+s ]
⇡ b0 + b1Et[ rplt+s ] (36)
since Et[ rpst+s ] ⇡ 0 if the forecast horizon (s) is su ciently long as opposed to rps’ half-life
but not so to rpl’s. Thus, equation (31) would converge to
y(n)t =
1
n
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(37)
for a large enough n.
Therefore, one can expect that long-term bond yields would be relatively more infor-
mative of long-term risk premiums (rplt) meanwhile short-term yields are so of short-term
premiums (rpst). This paper estimates rpl from Treasury bonds and rps from Treasury
bills. As will be shown later, rpl ’s half-life is estimated to be about 6 months meanwhile
rps ’ is even less than one month.
This paper estimates rpl following Cieslak and Povala (2011)’s approach, who estimate
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a risk premium factor as the residual of residuals from regressing T-bond yields on the two
components of short interest rates. They first regress each of 2- to 5-year bond yields on
the persistent component of inflation (⌧t)
y(n)t =  
(n)
0 +  
(n)
1 ⌧t + ✏
(n)
t for n = 2, · · · , 5 years (38)
and then regress the average of the residuals
⇣
✏¯t ⌘ 14
P5y
n=2y ✏ˆ
(n)
t
⌘
on the transitory deviation
of short rates ( t) without an intercept.
✏¯t =  1  t + ut (39)
Cieslak and Povala (2011) show that equation (39)’s residuals (uˆt) outperform both
Cochrane and Piazzesi (2005) and Ludvigson and Ng (2009)’s risk premium predictors in
the predictive regression of excess returns of holding long-term bonds. In particular, the
residuals are shown to beat Cochrane and Piazzesi (2005)’s tent-shaped risk premium factor
by the whopping margin of R2s of almost 20%. This paper uses the residuals as a proxy of
rpl. The top panel of Figure 9 shows its time series.
The three state variables that have been estimated thus far (⌧t,  t, and rplt) are based
on the replication of Cieslak and Povala (2011). This paper adds one more state variable–
short-term risk premium factor (rpst)–to the framework and focuses on the comparison of
the two risk premium factors, rpl and rps.
The distinction of rpl and rps is partly motivated by the qualitative di↵erence of annual
and monthly excess returns. Obviously, the most notable di↵erence is their smoothness. As
Figure 10 shows, annual excess returns appear far smoother than monthly excess returns
since the annual returns are estimated across overlapping periods.
However, the mechanical consequence of smoothing the time series is not their only
di↵erence. Note that, by rearranging the terms of equation (29), annual excess returns of
holding n-maturity bonds can be written as the sum of monthly excess returns of holding
n-maturity bonds less the sum of monthly excess returns of holding 1-year bonds.
exr(n)t,t+12 =
11X
i=0
exr(n i)t+i,t+i+1  
11X
i=0
exr(12 i)t+i,t+i+1 (40)
Since rps has a shorter half-life than rpl, rpst would have a significant predictive power
of exrt,t+1 but probably zero predictive power for exrt+11,t+12. In contrast, rpl’s predictive
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Figure 9: Time Series of Risk Premium Factors
This figure compares the time series of long- and short-term risk premium factors. The
former is estimated from Treasury bond yields meanwhile the latter is from Treasury bill
yields. The factors are demeaned and normalized. Shaded areas denote NBER recessions.
Details can be found in Section 2.2.3.
(a) Risk Premium Factor from Treasury Bonds (rplt)
(b) Risk Premium Factor from Treasury Bills (rpst)
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Figure 10: Time Series of Excess Returns
This figure compares the time series of annual and monthly excess returns from holding
3-year Treasury bonds. Shaded areas denote NBER recessions.
(a) Annual Excess Returns (exrt,t+1y)
(b) Monthly Excess Returns (exrt,t+1m)
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power is likely to be equally significant over various, if not all, forecast horizons. Thus, rpl
would have been given unfairly high weights than rps when risk premiums were proxied by
the predicted values of annual excess returns, dexr(n)t,t+12. For the estimation of rps, therefore,
it is crucial to use monthly excess returns.
Two implications have been stressed out throughout this section. First, short-term bond
yields are to be more informative of rps than long-term yields. rps’ influence is likely to
be almost completely missing from long-term yields. Second, monthly excess returns are
more important than annual excess returns to estimate rps. Based on the two implications,
therefore, this paper estimates rps from the predicted values of monthly excess returns by
1- and 3-month T-bill yields.
This paper estimates rpst as follows. First, 1- and 3-month T-bill yields are orthogo-
nalized by the first three state variables: ⌧t,  t and rplt. The T-bill data are downloaded
from the FRED database.25 Note that about 99% of the total variations of T-bill yields
are explained by the three state variables. Second, the average of monthly excess returns of
holding 2- to 5-year T-bonds
⇣
exrett,t+1 ⌘ 14
P5y
n=2y exret
(n)
t,t+1
⌘
is regressed on the orthog-
onalized T-bill yields, y˜(1m)t and y˜
(3m)
t .
exrett,t+1 =  0 +  1 y˜
(1m)
t +  2 y˜
(3m)
t + ✏t (41)
The predicted monthly excess returns from the above regression are used as the proxy
of the short-term risk premium factor, rpst. Its time series is shown by the bottom panel
of Figure 9, in which both risk premium factors are normalized by sample average and
standard deviation. The figure shows that rps’ time series is far more volatile than rpl’s,
being consistent with the di↵erent smoothness of annual and monthly excess returns in
Figure 10.
Remind the two implications upon which this paper relies: rps should be relevant to
short-term bond yields and monthly excess returns. Regarding the first implication, Section
2.4 will show that rps lowers the level of T-bill yields but has very little e↵ects on T-bonds.
In comparison, rpl is shown to raise the slope of T-bonds’ yield curve. Second, regarding
the implication of the excess returns, Section 2.3 will show that rps is more significant than
rpl in the forecast of excess returns in the next month. However, rps loses its forecastability
in but three months meanwhile rpl’s forecastability remains significant up to 15 months.
25http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/categories/116
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Table 8: Forecast of Annual Excess Returns
The dependent variable is excess returns of holding Treasury bonds over the next one year, exr(n)t,t+1y,
whose maturities are specified by the top row. Predictors in each panel are respectively attributed
to Cieslak and Povala (2011), Cochrane and Piazzesi (2005), and Du↵ee (2011). rpl’s estimation
method is explained in detail by Section 2.2.3. Numbers in parentheses are Newey-West t statistics
with 12 lags. ***, **, and * denote significances at 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively.
Maturity 2 years 3 years 5 years 7 years 10 years 15 years
Panel A. Forecast by rpl (Cieslak and Povala, 2011)
rpl 1.102*** 2.122*** 3.764*** 4.866*** 7.078*** 10.397***
(8.586) (9.142) (9.820) (10.079) (10.943) (10.155)
obs 504 504 504 504 461 458
R2 0.343 0.372 0.404 0.434 0.497 0.521
Panel B. Cochrane and Piazzesi (2005)’s Tent-Shaped Factor
tent 0.834*** 1.591*** 2.785*** 3.626*** 4.980*** 7.505***
(4.854) (4.634) (4.642) (4.663) (4.307) (4.429)
obs 504 504 504 504 461 458
R2 0.199 0.212 0.224 0.244 0.241 0.266
Panel C. Du↵ee (2011)’s Hidden Factor
hidden -0.701*** -1.443*** -2.420*** -3.062*** -4.624*** -6.833***
(-3.582) (-4.105) (-3.910) (-3.900) (-4.091) (-4.057)
obs 480 480 480 480 437 434
R2 0.135 0.167 0.164 0.170 0.196 0.206
2.3 Forecast of Excess Returns in the Bond Market
Risk premiums can be defined as the expected excess returns from holding risky assets.
For holding long-term Treasury bonds, its premiums can be considered a compensation for
bearing the interest rate risk.
Risk premiums themselves are not observable. However, if future excess returns can be
predicted by some observable variables at time t, one can consider that the unobservable
risk premiums can be projected on the space that is spanned by the observable predictors.
Therefore, if rpl and rps were indeed related to risk premiums, they would have been able
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to predict future excess returns from holding Treasury bonds.
Table 8 tests the forecastability of annual excess returns. The dependent variable is
the excess returns of holding Treasury bonds over the next one year, exr(n)t,t+1y, in which
risk-free short interest rates are estimated as one-year T-bond yields. Since Fama and Bliss
(1987), it has been a norm to use annual excess returns for the test of risk premium factors’
forecastability. The excess returns are estimated using the T-bond data provided by the
Federal Reserve Board of Governors,26 which are based on the Svensson curve approxima-
tion. Gurkaynak, Sack, and Wright (2006) explain how the dataset is constructed.
Panel A regresses the excess returns on rpl only, replicating Cieslak and Povala (2011)’s
predictability test. For comparison, Panel B and C regress the returns on the other two
benchmark risk premium factors. The former is Cochrane and Piazzesi (2005)’s tent-shaped
factor which is estimated from the predicted excess returns projected on five forward interest
rates. The latter is Du↵ee (2011)’s hidden factor which is estimated as a higher-order state
variable from a Kalman filtering under the restriction that the factor be hidden from the
cross-section of bond yields. The hidden factor can be downloaded from Gregory Du↵ee’s
website.27 Figure 11 shows the time series of the two benchmark risk premium factors.
Table 8 shows that rpl aptly outperforms the other benchmarks by a large margin. For
example, rpl’s R2’s in Panel A range from 34.3% to 52.1%. In comparison, the tent-shaped
factor’s R2’s in Panel B are from 19.9% to 26.6%, and the hidden factor’s R2’s in Panel
C are from 13.5% to 20.6%. rpl outperforms the other benchmarks in terms of statistical
significance too. rpl’s Newey-West t-statistics are 8.586 to 10.943 as opposed to the statistics
of 4.307⇠4.854 in Panel B and 3.852⇠4.108 in Panel C.
In particular, the drastic improvement of forecastability from Panel B to Panel A is
notably important since both predictors are estimated from the same dataset–the cross-
section of five Fama-Bliss bond yields28–except that rpl has the extra input of past core
inflation rates. The tent-shaped predictor in Panel B is the excess returns which are pre-
dicted by five forward interest rates, and rpl in Panel A is the residual bond yields which are
orthogonalized by the persistent and transitory components of short interest rates. Thus,
the improved forecastability implies that the persistent inflation component (i.e., the level
factor, or the first principal component, as will be shown in Section 2.4) has nothing to
do with the time-varying market price of risk. Note that R2’s become almost doubled by
26http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2006/200628/200628abs.html
27http://www.econ2.jhu.edu/people/Duffee/
28I intentionally specify the “Fama-Bliss” bond yields since, as shown by Dai, Singleton, and Yang (2004),
the tent shape is turned into a wave pattern if bond yields are estimated from di↵erent data sources.
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Figure 11: Other Benchmark Risk Premium Factors
This figure shows the time series of Cochrane and Piazzesi (2005)’s tent-shaped risk premium
factor and Du↵ee (2011)’s hidden factor. Cochrane and Piazzesi (2005) estimate the tent-shaped
factor as the predicted annual excess returns of holding Treasury bonds by five forward interest
rates, and Du↵ee (2011) estimates the hidden factor as a higher-order state variable of a Kalman
filtering method.
simply getting rid of the persistent component from predictors. In a similar vein, Dai,
Singleton, and Yang (2004) show that the tent shape of Cochrane and Piazzesi (2005)’s
risk premium factor is due to a mechanical e↵ect to o↵set the level factor of bond yields.
Cochrane and Piazzesi (2008) also show that the level factor is not related to the market
price of risk although its uncertainty is priced by the market.
However, strong forecastability of annual excess returns does not necessarily mean strong
forecastability for shorter investment horizons. There are three reasons to back the suspi-
cion. First, the predictive regression of annual returns with monthly observations is likely to
be contaminated by a long-horizon forecast bias since its dependent variable is mechanically
autocorrelated. For example, Boudoukh, Richardson, and Whitelaw (2007) show that long-
horizon forecast regressions exaggerate R2 and statistical significance. Second, as shown
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Table 9: Summary Statistics of Annual and Monthly Returns
The sample spans monthly observations from January 1968 to December 2010. Panel A is based
on the holding and excess returns from holding long-term Treasury bonds over the next one year
over one-year risk-free interest rate meanwhile Panel B is based on monthly returns with one-month
risk-free interest rate. Monthly excess returns of the stock market in Panel C are estimated from
Fama and French (1993)’s market factor.
Holding Returns Excess Returns Sharpe Annualized
Maturity Mean Stdev Mean Stdev Ratio Sharpe
Panel A. Annual Returns of Holding Treasury Bonds
2 years 0.0672 0.0364 0.0057 0.0187 0.306 0.306
3 years 0.0713 0.0460 0.0098 0.0344 0.286 0.286
4 years 0.0745 0.0561 0.0130 0.0477 0.272 0.272
5 years 0.0754 0.0650 0.0139 0.0586 0.238 0.238
7 years 0.0782 0.0771 0.0167 0.0731 0.228 0.228
10 years 0.0844 0.1039 0.0227 0.1018 0.222 0.222
15 years 0.0865 0.1475 0.0247 0.1465 0.169 0.169
Panel B. Monthly Returns of Holding Treasury Bonds
2 years 0.0056 0.0094 0.0011 0.0090 0.126 0.435
3 years 0.0060 0.0131 0.0015 0.0128 0.115 0.400
4 years 0.0063 0.0170 0.0017 0.0168 0.104 0.360
5 years 0.0063 0.0198 0.0018 0.0197 0.092 0.320
7 years 0.0065 0.0232 0.0020 0.0231 0.086 0.297
10 years 0.0069 0.0313 0.0024 0.0313 0.076 0.264
15 years 0.0070 0.0451 0.0025 0.0451 0.055 0.190
Panel C. Monthly Returns in the Stock Market
stock 0.0088 0.0465 0.0043 0.0466 0.093 0.322
by Figure 10, the time series of annual and monthly excess returns seem to have di↵erent
characteristics. Monthly excess returns look like short-term shocks which are added to the
long-term trends of annual excess returns. Third, annual excess returns inevitably ignore
the risk premiums born by one-year Treasury bonds since one-year bonds are considered a
riskfree asset for an annual horizon but a risky asset for a monthly period. One stylized fact
in the bond market is that, as shown by Du↵ee (2010), shorter-maturity bonds o↵er higher
Sharpe ratios. For example, Table 9 shows that the Sharpe ratios monotonically decrease
with bond maturities. Moreover, the Sharpe ratios of monthly excess returns are always
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higher than the ratios of annual excess returns since one-year bonds’ risk premiums are
subtracted from annual excess returns. For example, the Sharpe ratio of two-year Treasury
bonds’ monthly excess returns (0.435, annualized) is even higher than the ratio of the stock
market (0.322, annualized) meanwhile the Sharpe ratio of its annual excess returns (0.306)
is slightly lower than that. Thus, the act of ignoring one-year bonds’ risk premiums would
have probably undermined the authenticity of excess return forecasts.
Table 10 tests the forecastability of monthly excess returns. The dependent variable is
the excess returns from holding Treasury bonds for the next one month over one-month
T-bill yields, exr(n)t,t+1m. Panel A uses rpl as the only predictor. As suspected, its R
2’s drop
to 2.9%⇠4.3%, which are but one tenth of the R2’s in Table 8. Although not reported here,
the R2’s of the other benchmark predictors also drop to 1%⇠2%.
Panel B, however, shows that the monthly return forecast is significantly improved by
adding T-bill yields as predictors. The two additional explanatory variables, y˜(1m)t and
y˜(3m)t , are the residuals of regressing 1- and 3-month T-bill yields on the first three state
variables (⌧t,  t, and rplt). The residuals of T-bill yields improve R2’s from 2.9%⇠4.3%
in Panel A to 8.1%⇠11.2% in Panel B. Furthermore, the significant coe cients of y˜(1m)t
and y˜(3m)t imply that T-bill yields contain unique information that is spanned by neither
persistent inflation nor T-bond yields.
Panel C concludes the test by regressing the monthly excess returns on the two risk pre-
mium factors, rpl and rps. As explained by Section 2.2.3, rps is estimated as the predicted
monthly excess returns by y˜(1m)t and y˜
(3m)
t . Thus, it is intuitive that rps’s coe cients in
Panel C would be as significant as those of the residuals in Panel B. On top of that, R2’s
in Panel C are virtually equal to those in Panel B, implying that the residuals’ predictive
contents are well captured by rps alone. Note that both rpl and rps are normalized by
sample mean and standard deviation. The last column of Panel C implies that the monthly
excess return from holding 15-year T-bonds is expected to be higher by 0.861% when rpl is
one standard deviation high and rps is zero, or by 1.183% when rpl is zero and rps is one
standard deviation high.
As Figure 9 shows, rps is far more volatile than rpl. In particular, rpl’s half-life is
estimated to be about 6 months meanwhile rps’ is less then one month. This is consistent
with this paper’s motivation that rps is responsible for the volatile fluctuation of monthly
excess returns, the information that is reflected by T-bills but not by T-bonds. Since rps
has a shorter half-life, moreover, one can also expect that rps would have a shorter forecast
horizon than rpl, which is tested in Table 11.
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Table 10: Forecast of Monthly Excess Returns
The dependent variable is excess returns of holding Treasury bonds over the next one month,
exr(n)t,t+1m, whose maturities are specified by the top row. rpl and rps denote risk premium fac-
tors which are estimated respectively from Treasury bonds and Treasury bills. y˜(1m)t and y˜
(3m)
t
denote 1- and 3-month Treasury bills orthogonalized by the persistent and transitory components
of risk-free interest rates and rpl. Details about their estimation can be found in Section 2.2.3.
Numbers in parentheses are Newey-West t statistics with 12 lags. ***, **, and * denote significances
at 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. respectively.
Maturity 2 years 3 years 5 years 7 years 10 years 15 years
Panel A. Forecast by rpl Only
rpl 0.152*** 0.240*** 0.376*** 0.466*** 0.633*** 0.895***
(3.651) (4.229) (4.885) (5.190) (5.120) (5.157)
obs 515 515 515 515 472 469
R2 0.029 0.035 0.036 0.041 0.043 0.041
Panel B. Forecast by rpl and the Residuals of T-bills
rpl 0.152*** 0.240*** 0.376*** 0.466*** 0.612*** 0.860***
(3.297) (3.838) (4.467) (4.946) (4.726) (4.771)
y˜(1m)t 0.165** 0.240** 0.349** 0.390** 0.484* 0.749**
(2.307) (2.126) (2.178) (2.172) (1.942) (2.192)
y˜(3m)t -0.268*** -0.386*** -0.595*** -0.689*** -0.970*** -1.536***
(-3.296) (-3.170) (-3.612) (-3.811) (-3.940) (-4.718)
obs 515 515 515 515 472 469
R2 0.081 0.088 0.090 0.093 0.101 0.112
Panel C. Forecast by rpl and rps
rpl 0.152*** 0.240*** 0.376*** 0.466*** 0.612*** 0.861***
(3.298) (3.837) (4.485) (4.977) (4.794) (4.848)
rps 0.205*** 0.295*** 0.456*** 0.528*** 0.747*** 1.183***
(3.293) (3.186) (3.635) (3.863) (4.068) (4.872)
obs 515 515 515 515 472 469
R2 0.081 0.088 0.090 0.093 0.100 0.111
The dependent variables in each panel of Table 11 are monthly excess returns in 3,
12, and 15 months (exr(n)t+3m,t+4m, exr
(n)
t+12m,t+13m, and exr
(n)
t+15m,t+16m). The table shows
55
Table 11: Forecast of Monthly Excess Returns in Further Periods
The dependent variable is monthly excess returns of holding Treasury bonds in further periods,
exr(n)t+ ,t+ +1 for   = 3, 12, and 15 months. rpl and rps denote risk premium factors which are
estimated respectively from Treasury bonds and Treasury bills. Details about their estimation can
be found in Section 2.2.3. Numbers in parentheses are Newey-West t statistics with 12 lags. ***,
**, and * denote significances at 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively.
Maturity 2 years 3 years 5 years 7 years 10 years 15 years
Panel A. Monthly Excess Returns in One Quarter, exr(n)t+3m,t+4m
rplt 0.175*** 0.279*** 0.428*** 0.499*** 0.687*** 0.974***
(5.488) (6.448) (6.657) (6.827) (7.013) (6.387)
rpst 0.003 0.017 0.050 0.052 -0.007 -0.129
(0.030) (0.130) (0.307) (0.311) (-0.029) (-0.345)
obs 512 512 512 516 476 473
R2 0.037 0.047 0.047 0.047 0.050 0.049
Panel B. Monthly Excess Returns in One Year, exr(n)t+12m,t+13m
rplt 0.178*** 0.268*** 0.406*** 0.492*** 0.647*** 0.871***
(4.083) (4.734) (4.974) (5.393) (5.319) (4.851)
rpst -0.047 -0.042 -0.062 -0.069 -0.059 0.051
(-1.574) (-0.909) (-0.872) (-0.780) (-0.445) (0.245)
obs 503 503 503 507 476 473
R2 0.041 0.044 0.042 0.045 0.044 0.038
Panel C. Monthly Excess Returns in 15 Months, exr(n)t+15m,t+16m
rplt 0.067 0.113* 0.169* 0.205* 0.280* 0.365
(1.431) (1.737) (1.745) (1.704) (1.729) (1.596)
rpst -0.018 -0.027 -0.068 -0.100 -0.181 -0.240
(-0.261) (-0.324) (-0.567) (-0.675) (-0.967) (-1.047)
obs 500 500 500 504 476 473
R2 0.006 0.008 0.008 0.010 0.011 0.009
that rps completely loses its forecastability in three months. Though not reported, rps’s
predictability appears significant in only up to two months. In contrast, rpl’s forecastability
survives for a horizon of up to 15 months. Particularly, rpl appears significant at 1%
confidence level even in one year. Thus, the table confirms that rps’ forecastability is
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limited to a short horizon whereas rpl’s forecastability remains strong fore more than one
year.
Every term structure model is essentially a function of mapping state variables into
bond yields. In other words, excess returns can be written by the changes in state vari-
ables. Therefore, better forecasts of state variables would lead to better forecasts of excess
returns. Remind that this paper assumes four state variables: the persistent and transitory
components of short interest rates (⌧t and  t) and the long- and short-term components of
risk premiums (rplt and rpst). Table 12 estimates the VAR(1) process of the state variables
to understand their dynamics.
Panel A’s dependent variables are the changes in state variables, which are specified in
the first row below the panel heading. Note that ⌧t’s coe cient in column (1) is close to
zero, implying that the persistent inflation component is as persistent as a random walk
process. In comparison,  t’s coe cient of  0.044 in column (2) implies that its half-life
is about 15.4 (=   log(2)/ log(1   0.044)) months. rplt’s coe cient of  0.109 in column
(3) and rpst’s coe cient of  0.713 in column (4) imply that their half-lives are 6.0 (=
  log(2)/ log(1   0.109)) and 0.55 (=   log(2)/ log(1   0.713)) months respectively. These
results are consistent with Figure 8 and 9’s findings that ⌧t is the most persistent state
variable, followed by  t, rplt, and rpst. Moreover, note that  t’s coe cient in column (1)
is significantly positive since the Federal Reserve Board raises short interest rates in the
anticipation of high inflation in subsequent periods.
The most important implication in Panel A is based on rplt and rpst’s coe cients in
column (1) and (2), which imply that both risk premium factors predict a decrease in
short interest rates. However, they do so in di↵erent ways. rplt predicts a decrease in the
persistent inflation (⌧t) meanwhile rpst does a decrease in the transitory component of short
interest rates ( t). This panel confirms that their forecast abilities are based on di↵erent
dimensions.
The dependent variables in Panel B are the changes in bond yields with the maturities
of 1 month, 1 year, 5 years, and 15 years. The panel again confirms that the two risk
premium factors have di↵erent relative strengths. rpl’s predictability becomes stronger for
longer-maturity bonds. In contrast, rps is shown to have the U-shaped predictive power,
which o↵ers the highest significance for the changes of 1-month and 15-year bond yields
and the lowest for those of 1-year bonds.
rpl’s forecastability monotonically increases with bond maturities since longer-maturity
bond yields have higher loadings on rpl as implied by equation (31) and (37). Also, as
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Table 12: Forecast of State Variables and Bond Yields
Panel A forecasts the changes in four state variables: ⌧ ,  , rpl, and rps. ⌧ and   denote the
persistent and transitory components of risk-free interest rates whereas rpl and rps denote long-
and short-term risk premium factors. Their estimation is explained in detail by Section 2.2.2 and
2.2.3. The dependent variables in Panel B are the changes in bond yields. Numbers in parentheses
are Newey-West t statistics with 12 lags. ***, **, and * denote significances at 1%, 5%, and 10%
level respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A. Forecast of the Changes in State Variables
dep. var.  ⌧t+1   t+1  rplt+1  rpst+1
⌧t 0.000 -0.001 0.007 0.002
(0.014) (-0.043) (0.325) (0.028)
 t 0.008*** -0.044*** 0.002 -0.040
(4.449) (-2.983) (0.082) (-0.786)
rplt -0.005*** -0.003 -0.109*** 0.047
(-3.033) (-0.157) (-4.552) (0.770)
rpst -0.001 -0.078*** 0.010 -0.713***
(-1.044) (-3.620) (0.414) (-12.387)
obs 515 515 515 515
R2 0.264 0.091 0.055 0.359
Panel B. Forecast of the Changes in Bond Yields
dep. var.  y(1m)t+1  y
(1y)
t+1  y
(5y)
t+1  y
(15y)
t+1
maturity 1 month 1 year 5 years 15 years
⌧t -0.003 -0.001 0.003 0.007
(-0.082) (-0.034) (0.153) (0.480)
 t -0.039 -0.048** -0.025 -0.017
(-1.208) (-2.066) (-1.481) (-1.328)
rplt 0.007 -0.024 -0.058*** -0.054***
(0.150) (-0.880) (-3.749) (-4.649)
rpst -0.320*** -0.102*** -0.078*** -0.078***
(-7.729) (-2.920) (-3.368) (-4.857)
obs 515 515 515 469
R2 0.152 0.061 0.080 0.108
Panel A of the table shows, the best predictor of rplt+1 is rplt itself. Thus, higher loadings
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of bond yields on rpl imply that more changes of the yields can be predicted by rpl. Due to
the same reason, rps has the highest predictability of the changes of 1-month bond yields⇣
 y(1m)t+1
⌘
since T-bill yields have higher loadings on rps. In addition, rps’ predictability
becomes strong for the changes of long-maturity bond yields due to its forecastability of
  t+1.
2.4 Principal Components of Yield Curves and the Literature of a Hidden
Factor
Bond yields, as shown by equation (31), are the sum of the averages of expected short
interest rates and risk premiums. Thus, one can expect that high risk premiums would
raise bond yields. The intuition is supported by Fama and Bliss (1987) who show that
high risk premiums are related to high slope of yield curves. Their finding implies that
long-maturity bonds have higher loadings on risk premiums than short-maturity yields.
However, the recent literature has discovered some evidence that opposes the intuition.
For example, Cochrane and Piazzesi (2005) estimate a tent-shaped risk premium factor
by regressing the annual excess returns of holding Treasury bonds on five forward interest
rates and conclude that “the return-forecasting factor is clearly not related to any of the
first three principal components.” In other words, the tent-shaped risk premium factor does
not a↵ect the shape of a yield curve since the first three principal components–level, slope,
and curvature–are able to explain 99.9% of the total variations of yield curves. It is why
bond risk premiums are given the sobriquet as a “hidden factor” by the recent literature.
In a similar vein, Ludvigson and Ng (2009) show that macroeconomic variables contain risk
premium information, but the information is also hidden from yield curves.
The latest literature such as Du↵ee (2011) and Joslin, Priebsch, and Singleton (2010)
explains that the risk premium factor is hidden since an increase in risk premiums is o↵set
by a decrease in expected short interest rates. The hidden factor changes the relative
proportion of risk-free rates and risk premiums, but not their sums, i.e., bond yields. Du↵ee
(2011) estimates the hidden factor as a higher-order state variable of the Kalman filtering
method, and Joslin, Priebsch, and Singleton (2010) estimate it using macroeconomic data
such as output growth and inflation. Chernov and Mueller (2011) show that the hidden
factor “a↵ects inflation expectations at all horizons, but has almost no e↵ect on the nominal
yields.”
But Cieslak and Povala (2011) reach a di↵erent conclusion. Their risk premium factor
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does raise the slope of yield curves. They explain that the factor seems to be hidden because
the slope factor–the second principal component–is driven by not only risk premiums but
also the transitory component of short interest rates ( t). The former raises the long end of
a yield curve meanwhile the latter does the short end. The Shapley decomposition shows
that 70% and 27% of the slope factor’s variations are explained by transitory short rates and
risk premiums respectively. The paper only briefly mentions the hidden factor literature.
My paper adds a new perspective to the debate. I find positive evidence backing all of
the aforementioned papers. For example, the results support Fama and Bliss (1987) and
Cieslak and Povala (2011) since the long-term risk premium factor (rpl) raises the slope of
yield curves. This paper also agrees with Du↵ee (2011) and Joslin, Priebsch, and Singleton
(2010) since the short-term risk premium factor (rps) is almost completely hidden from T-
bond yields. As the hidden factor literature explains, rps predicts high risk premiums but
does not a↵ect the shape of yield curves. Cochrane and Piazzesi (2005) are also supported
since higher-order principal components are dominantly determined by the two risk premium
factors.
Figure 12 shows how Treasury bond yields are a↵ected when each state variable is
deviated by +/  two standard deviations. Each subfigure is labeled according to a given
state variable. The horizontal axis denotes maturities in years from 1 to 15 years, and
the vertical axis denotes annualized bond yields. The figure is plotted based on the OLS
coe cients of regressing T-bond yields on the state variables. Simple OLS regression is used
to estimate the factor loadings instead of a ne term structure model since, as Du↵ee (2009)
and Joslin, Singleton, and Zhu (2011) show, the results are invariant to the imposition of
no-arbitrage restrictions and thus the a ne model adds very little improvement over the
OLS regression.
Panel (a) shows that the persistent inflation component (⌧t) shifts the level of yield
curves. This e↵ect is intuitive given the near-unit-root persistence of the variable. Panel (b)
and (c) show that yield curves’ slope factor is determined by the transitory short interest rate
( t) as well as the long-term risk premium factor (rplt). High  t flattens the slope by raising
short-maturity bond yields meanwhile high rplt steepens it by raising long-maturity yields.
Panel (d) confirms that the short-term risk premium factor (rpst) is almost completely
hidden from T-bond yields.
In comparison, Figure 13 shows the factor loadings of Treasury bill yields. The horizon-
tal axis denotes maturities in months from 1 to 12 months, and the vertical axis denotes
annualized bond yields. The factor loadings are estimated by regressing Fama TBill Struc-
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tures (available from CRSP) on the state variables.
The comparison of Figure 12 and Figure 13 o↵ers interesting di↵erences. First, the
level of T-bill yields is determined by the two components of short interest rates, ⌧t and
 t, meanwhile the level of T-bond yields is determined only by ⌧t. Second, T-bill yields’
slope is jointly determined by the two risk premium factors, rplt and rpst, but the slope of
T-bond yields is driven by  t and rplt.
In particular, the two figures imply that Treasury bills are likely to be over-priced when
rps is high although it does not a↵ect the prices of Treasury bonds at all. Therefore,
one may expect that rps’ implication in the financial markets is probably based on the
market segmentation between T-bonds and T-bills. For example, Du↵ee (1996) shows that
the market segmentation has increased since the early 1980s. Given that T-bills provide
convenience yields to investors, as argued by Grinblatt (2001), we can expect rpst to be
related to liquidity measures in the financial market since convenience yields are proportional
to the demands of liquidity. This hypothesis will be tested in the next section.
Lastly, Table 13 shows the contribution of each state variable to the explained variations
of principal components. For example, its Panel A implies that 83.46% and 13.07% of the
level factor (PC1)’s variations can be explained by ⌧t and  t respectively. The contributions
are estimated by the Shapley decomposition method. Numbers in any row are summed to
one hundred. Panel A uses 15 T-bond yields to estimate principle components meanwhile
Panel B uses the 15 T-bond yields in addition to three T-bill yields with the maturities of
1, 3, and 6 months. By a mechanical reason, Panel B’s principal components are supposed
to be more informative of T-bill yields than Panel A’s principal components.
The table shows that the slope factor (PC2)’s variations are largely driven by  t and
rplt, each of which explains 70% (57%) and 27% (37%) of the factor’s variations according
to Panel A (Panel B). This result is consistent with the factor loadings of T-bond yields
in Figure 12, which shows that the slope becomes steeper when  t is low or rplt is high.
Moreover, it also explains why the slope factor per se is a poor proxy of risk premiums. Not
only it fails to outperform other benchmark risk premium factors in the predictive regression
of bond excess returns, but also it loses all significance when monthly excess returns are
used as a dependent variable. As the table shows, a large amount of the slope’s variations
are determined by  t, which has nothing to do with risk premiums.
The table also shows that higher-order principal components are dominated by the two
risk premium factors, rplt and rpst. For example, according to Panel A, rplt explains 89%
of PC4’s variations and rpst does 72% of PC5’s variations. Interestingly, it is notable that
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Table 13: Decomposition of Principal Components by State Variables
This table shows the contributions of the four state variables to the explained variance of the
respective principal components. Each state variable’s contribution is computed using the Shapley
decomposition. Numbers in one row are summed to one hundred. In Panel A, fifteen Treasury bond
yields with the maturities of 1 to 15 years are used for the estimation of principal components. In
Panel B, three Treasury bill yields of 1, 3, and 6-month maturities are used along with the fifteen
Treasury bond yields.
Persistent Transitory Long-term Short-term
Inflation (⌧) Short Rates ( ) Risk Premium (rpl) Risk Premium (rps)
Panel A. 15 T-bond Yields (1 to 15 Years)
PC1 (Level) 83.46 13.07 3.46 0.01
PC2 (Slope) 3.45 69.79 26.74 0.02
PC3(Curvature) 0.17 7.95 90.74 1.14
PC4 0.69 0.14 88.71 10.45
PC5 3.84 7.19 17.23 71.75
Panel B. 15 T-bond and 3 T-bill Yields (1, 3, and 6 Months)
PC1 (Level) 81.35 16.48 2.16 0.02
PC2 (Slope) 5.13 57.39 36.94 0.53
PC3(Curvature) 0.68 8.48 75.67 15.16
PC4 0.06 0.40 30.87 68.67
PC5 0.46 2.72 0.35 96.46
PC5’s variations are dominantly determined by rpst even when T-bill yields are not used
for the principal components’ estimation. This result also explains the commentary of the
literature that higher-order principal components are more informative of risk premiums in
the bond market than the first three principal components.
2.5 Relation to the Financial Market
2.5.1 Liquidity in the Bond Market
Treasury bills are special. Their values rise during a financial crisis since they are considered
the safest collaterals in the world. For example, the yield on the three-month Treasury
bill even turned negative on December 9, 2008, three months after the Lehman Brothers’
collapse, as investors had sought for a safe haven.29 One-month Treasury bill yields briefly
29http://blogs.wsj.com/marketbeat/2008/12/09/three-month-bill-yield-goes-negative/
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went negative again on August 4, 2011, since the European woes had cast a shadow over
the market.
Even when compared to other types of credit-risk-free assets such as other government
securities, Treasury bills still look di↵erent. For example, Du↵ee (1996) describes that the
market segmentation between T-bills and T-bonds has increased since the early 1980s. Kr-
ishnamurthy (2010) also documents that the repo haircut rate of short-term Treasuries had
been fixated at 2% in 2007-2009 meanwhile those of long-term Treasuries and investment-
grade corporate bonds soared from 5% to 6% and 5% to 20% respectively.
The previous section shows that the short-term risk premium factor (rps) a↵ects only the
prices of Treasury bills. Its influence on Treasury bonds is next to nothing. Considering the
value of T-bills as the safest haven, we can expect rps to be related to liquidity premiums.
Motivated by the intuition, this section is committed to comparing rps to various liquidity
measures in the bond market.
Fontaine and Garcia (2012) estimate bond liquidity premiums as the di↵erence of yields
between on-the-run (most recently issued) and o↵-the-run (seasoned) Treasury bonds.30
Since on-the-run bonds are more liquid and thus have higher values as collaterals than o↵-
the-run bonds, the yield di↵erential of on-the-run bonds over o↵-the-run ones is likely to
increase when there are strong demands for liquidity. Figure 14 compares the time series
of bond liquidity premiums to rps. To make the comparison easy to see, the figure shows
the rolling average of rps over the previous three months.
The figure shows that the two time series are remarkably overlapped with each other.
They both peaked in 2008 after the Lehman Brothers collapsed and in 1987 after the
infamous stock market crash on the Black Monday. They also soared during the Tequila
crisis in 1994 and remained high throughout the Asian currency crisis in 1997 and the
Russian moratorium and the subsequent demise of the Long Term Capital Management
(LTCM) in 1998.
Figure 15 compares rps to two other measures of liquidity in the bond market. Panel
(a) is based on 3-year interest rate swap spreads, which is a close but not perfect liquidity
measure since the spread is determined not only by convenience yields (Grinblatt, 2001)
but also by counterpart risks (Du e and Singleton, 1997). Panel (b) uses the Merrill Lynch
Option Volatility Estimate (MOVE) index, which is defined as a yield curve weighted index
of the normalized implied volatility on 1-month Treasury options. Note that volatility is
closely related to liquidity demands since investors are required to put up more collaterals
30I am grateful to Jean-Sebastien Fontaine and Rene Garcia for generously sharing the data.
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Figure 14: Fontaine and Garcia (2012)’s Bond Liquidity Premiums
Fontaine and Garcia (2012) estimate bond liquidity premiums using the di↵erence of yields
between on-the-run (most recently issued) and o↵-the-run (seasoned) Treasury bonds. This figure
compares the time series of the bond liquidity premiums to the rolling average of short-term risk
premium factor (rps) over the past three months.
(or, higher haircuts) when volatility soars (Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2009). The data of
interest-rate swap spreads and MOVE index are downloaded from Bloomberg. The figure
shows that both time series are highly correlated to rps.
In Panel (a), both rps and interest rate swap spreads jumped after the collapse of the
Lehman Brothers in 2008 and during the IT bubble bursts in 2000. However, the swap
spreads hardly budged during the other episodes of financial crises. For example, the swap
spreads remained low and calm around the LTCM collapse in 1998 as well as the Enron
scandal in 2001, during both of which rps showed large movements.
The time series of MOVE index in Panel (b) also soared sharply during major financial
crises such as in 1994, 1998, 2001, and 2008. However, the index responded little to the
financial market turmoils in 1997 and 2000.
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Figure 15: Other Liquidity Measures in the Bond Market
This figure compares the short-term risk premium factor (rps) to two other liquidity mea-
sures in the bond market. Panel (a) uses 3-year interest rate swap spreads, and Panel (b)
uses the Merrill Lynch Option Volatility Estimate (MOVE) index, which is a yield curve
weighted index of the normalized implied volatility on 1-month Treasury options. The
short-term risk premium factor (rps) is averaged over the past three months.
(a) 3-Year Interest Rate Swap Spreads
(b) Merrill Lynch Option Volatility Estimate (MOVE)
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Figure 16: Commercial Paper Spreads
This figure compares the short-term risk premium factor (rps) to commercial paper spreads.
The commercial paper market is an important source of quick fundings for high-grade
firms. The average maturity in the commercial paper market is around 40 days, and its
predominant buyers are money market managers. FRED began providing commercial paper
spreads separately for financial and non-financial firms only since March 1997. The short-
term risk premium factor (rps) is averaged over the past three months.
(a) 3-Month Commercial Paper Spreads
(b) 3-Month Financial Commercial Paper Spreads
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Lastly, Figure 16 compares rps to commercial paper spreads. The commercial paper
market is an important source of quick fundings for high-grade firms. The average maturity
in the commercial paper market is around 40 days, and its predominant buyers are money
market managers. FRED began providing commercial paper spreads separately for financial
and non-financial firms only since March 1997.31 Until then, only the aggregate commercial
paper spreads are provided. Panel (a) of the figure shows the aggregate 3-month commercial
paper spreads and Panel (b) the spreads of financial firms. Commercial papers have short
maturities so that they have little exposure to an interest rate risk. The figure confirms
high correlation of rps to commercial paper spreads.
2.5.2 Risk Premium Factors in the Stock Market
Risk premiums in the bond market have been discussed so far. Naturally it raises a question
whether they are also related to the stock market. The no arbitrage model imposes that all
risk premiums should have come from the covariance between asset returns and innovation
shocks to a pricing kernel. If an universal pricing kernel is able to price both bond and stock
markets, this paper’s risk premium factors might have been related to the risk premiums in
the stock market.
This section is motivated by Koijen, Lustig, and Van Nieuwerburgh (2010), who show
that “innovations to the nominal bond risk premium price the book-to-market sorted stock
portfolios.” They find that the joint portfolios of stocks and bonds can be priced by three
state variables: the level factor of yield curves, stock market returns, and Cochrane and
Piazzesi (2005)’s tent-shaped risk premium factor. Interestingly, growth to value stock
portfolios are found to have monotonically increasing loadings on the tent-shaped factor,
implying that value and bond risk premiums might have the same roots. Let me briefly
describe its theoretical background below.
Let Xt denote a column vector of demeaned state variables, which are assumed to follow
a VAR(1) process.
Xt+1 =  Xt + ✏t+1, ⌦ ⌘ E
h
✏t+1✏
>
t+1
i
(42)
One-period risk-free interest rate, rt, is given as a linear function of state variables.
rt =  0 +  
>Xt (43)
31http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/categories/120
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The market price of risk,  t, is a column vector which is also linearly proportional to
state variables.
 t =  0 + ⇤Xt (44)
where  0 2 Rn and ⇤ 2 Rn⇥n. Thus, the log nominal pricing kernel can be derived as
mt+1 =  rt   1
2
 >t ⌦ t    >t ✏t+1 (45)
Under the no arbitrage assumption, all risk premiums should have come from the co-
variance of asset returns and the pricing kernel,
Et
h
exr(j)t+1
i
= covt
⇣
exr(j)t+1, mt+1
⌘
= covt
⇣
exr(j)t+1, ✏t+1
⌘
 t
= ⌃j ( 0 + ⇤Xt) (46)
where exr(j)t+1 denotes the excess returns from holding a risky asset j, and ⌃j the covariance
between the returns and the innovation shocks to state variables. By taking unconditional
expectations on both sides of equation (46),
E
h
exr(j)t+1
i
= ⌃j  0 (47)
For example, suppose the covariance matrix, ⌃j , is estimated for each of value portfo-
lios. If the value premium were related to the i-th state variable, ⌃ji would have shown a
monotonically increasing (or decreasing) pattern over j.
Figure 17 shows the coe cients of regressing the excess returns of value, size, and
momentum decile portfolios on the contemporary innovation shocks to the two risk premium
factors, frpl and grps. The innovation shocks are measured as the residuals of estimating rpl
and rps’ time series as two independent AR(1) processes. This figure is to illustrate the
estimated covariance matrix, ⌃j . Stock portfolio return data are downloaded from Kenneth
French’s website.32
Being consistent with Koijen, Lustig, and Van Nieuwerburgh (2010), the figure shows
that the long-term risk premium factor (rpl) is related to all three cross-sectional stock risk
premiums. frpl’s coe cients show monotonic patterns in all panels, implying that rpl is
positively related to value and size premiums and negatively to momentums. In contrast,
32http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html
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Figure 17: Stock Portfolio Returns
This figure shows the coe cients of regressing stock portfolio excess returns on the con-
temporary innovation shocks to two risk premium factors, rpl and rps. Portfolio 1 on the
horizontal axis denotes growth / small / loser stocks meanwhile Portfolio 10 denotes value
/ large / winner stocks. Portfolio returns are downloaded from Kenneth French’s website.
(a) Value Portfolios
(b) Size Portfolios
(c) Momentum Portfolios
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Table 14: Stock Return Factors
The dependent variables are the Fama-French three factors and the momentum factor, which are
denoted on the first row. The explanatory variables are contemporary innovation shocks to the
state variables. Panel A accounts for the shocks to risk premium factors only, and Panel B does all
innovation shocks. Numbers in parentheses are OLS t statistics. ***, **, and * denote significances
at 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively.
MktRf SMB HML MOM
Panel A. Innovation Shocks to Risk Premium Factorsfrplt -0.313 0.663** 0.990*** -1.509***
(-0.690) (2.239) (3.179) (-3.481)grpst -0.664*** -0.035 -0.082 0.172
(-3.082) (-0.248) (-0.552) (0.838)
obs 515 515 515 515
R2 0.018 0.010 0.021 0.026
Panel B. All Innovation Shocks
⌧˜t -5.003 -0.954 21.502** -4.691
(-0.380) (-0.111) (2.377) (-0.371)
 ˜t -2.174*** -1.023** -0.133 0.790
(-2.944) (-2.115) (-0.262) (1.112)frplt -0.265 0.688** 1.027*** -1.537***
(-0.587) (2.324) (3.306) (-3.536)grpst -0.522** 0.032 -0.065 0.119
(-2.378) (0.226) (-0.433) (0.562)
obs 515 515 515 515
R2 0.035 0.019 0.032 0.029
grps’ coe cients seem to be flat, but they are all significantly di↵erent from zero. Thus, rps
can be considered closely related to stock market returns.
As a robustness check, Table 14 directly regresses the Fama-French three factors and
the momentum factor on the contemporary innovation shocks to state variables. Panel A
takes into account only the two risk premium factors meanwhile Panel B does all four state
variables. This table confirms the previous finding that rps is attributed to stock market
returns meanwhile rpl is to value, size, and momentum premiums.
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2.6 Macroeconomic Growth
The slope factor of a yield curve has attracted not only the attentions of financial economists
but also those of monetary policymakers since the slope is known to be the best predictor of
recession. For example, Stambaugh (1988) explains that “inverted term structures precede
recessions and upward-sloping structures precede recoveries,” and Estrella and Mishkin
(1998) find that “the slope of the yield curve emerges as the clear individual choice” as
a predictor of US recessions. Ang, Piazzesi, and Wei (2006) also document that “every
recession after the mid-1960s was predicted by a negative slope–an inverted yield curve–
within 6 quarters of the impending recession. Moreover, there has been only one ‘false
positive’ (an instance of an inverted yield curve that was not followed by a recession)
during this time period.” The Federal Reserve Bank also acknowledges that “the slope of
the yield curve is a reliable predictor of future real economic activity.”33
This paper shows that the slope factor is determined by two state variables: the tran-
sitory component of short interest rates ( t) and the long-term risk premium factor (rplt).
The question is which of them o↵ers the forecastability of future macroeconomic activities.
To answer the question, Table 15 regresses future monthly macroeconomic growth rates
on the state variables. Panel A and B measure the macroeconomic activities using the
Industrial Productions which are provided by the Federal Reserve Board of Governors.34
Their monthly growth rates are estimated as GRt+i ⌘ (Xt+i/Xt+i 1   1) ⇥ 100. Panel
A is based on the total industrial production meanwhile Panel B is on the production of
consumer goods.
The table shows that  t dominates the forecast of macroeconomic growth for the forecast
horizon of less than 18 months. High short interest rates are likely to be followed by low
economic growth in subsequent periods. However, for the forecast horizon of longer than 18
months, rplt outpaces  t’s forecastability. For example, with the total industrial production
index as in Panel A,  t remains significant at 5% level for the horizon of 1 to 20 months
meanwhile rplt appears significant from 18 to 37 months (the details are not reported in
the table due to the lack of space). Low long-term risk premiums are likely to be followed
by recessions in a remote future.
Both variables indicate that flatter slopes are more likely to be followed by recessions.
However, it is interesting to note the di↵erence of their forecast horizon.  t’s dominant
33http://www.ny.frb.org/research/capital_markets/ycfaq.html
34http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g17/download.htm
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Table 15: Forecast of Macroeconomic Growth
The dependent variable is monthly growth rates of macroeconomic activities, which are shown on the
first row. The growth rates of industrial productions are computed as GRt+i ⌘ (Xt+i/Xt+i 1   1)⇥
100. Numbers in parentheses are Newey-West t statistics with 12 lags. ***, **, and * denote
significances at 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively.
GRt+1 GRt+3 GRt+6 GRt+12 GRt+18 GRt+24
Panel A. Industrial Production: Total
⌧t 0.922 1.236 1.670 2.038 2.393 2.556
(0.280) (0.401) (0.562) (0.732) (0.814) (0.816)
 t -0.088* -0.189*** -0.197*** -0.187*** -0.128** -0.011
(-1.691) (-3.232) (-3.575) (-4.893) (-2.422) (-0.194)
rplt 0.059 0.057 0.040 0.074 0.127** 0.102**
(1.173) (1.230) (0.877) (1.334) (2.298) (1.995)
rpst 0.010 -0.044 -0.006 0.104** 0.062* 0.019
(0.171) (-0.843) (-0.113) (2.430) (1.723) (0.385)
obs 515 513 510 504 498 492
R2 0.020 0.072 0.072 0.091 0.067 0.023
Panel B. Industrial Production: Consumer Goods
⌧t 1.504 1.766 2.005 2.259 2.226 2.370
(0.748) (0.904) (1.053) (1.187) (1.115) (1.117)
 t -0.102*** -0.157*** -0.129*** -0.065* -0.030 0.078*
(-2.694) (-3.770) (-3.157) (-1.830) (-0.624) (1.703)
rplt 0.101*** 0.092** 0.094** 0.119** 0.108*** 0.062*
(2.627) (2.538) (2.554) (2.483) (2.635) (1.655)
rpst -0.026 -0.046 -0.036 0.062 -0.003 -0.048
(-0.605) (-1.036) (-0.722) (1.251) (-0.078) (-1.063)
obs 515 513 510 504 498 492
R2 0.030 0.049 0.038 0.032 0.019 0.016
forecastability for a short horizon seems to be straightforward. The Fed uses its clout over
short interest rates to rein in macroeconomic activities. However, rplt’s forecastability of a
long horizon is rather mysterious. It may be related to an uncontrollable component of a
yield curve, reminding of Alan Greenspan’s conundrum in 2005.35 In addition, rpst’s lack
of forecastability is consistent with Du↵ee (2011)’s finding that a hidden factor has little
relevance to macroeconomic variables.
35http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/hh/2005/february/testimony.htm
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2.7 Conclusion
This paper finds that bond risk premiums consist of two factors: one for a long term and the
other for a short term. The long-term factor raises the slope of a yield curve. In contrast, the
short-term factor is completely hidden from Treasury bond yields but pulls down the yields
of Treasury bills. The long-term factor predicts monthly excess returns over the horizon of
even longer than one year meanwhile the short-term factor loses its predictability completely
in one quarter. The two factors also have di↵erent economic implications. The long-term
factor predicts future economic growth, and the short-term factor is closely related to bond
liquidity premiums. Lastly, the long-term factor is found to be related to value, size, and
momentum premiums in the stock market whereas the short-term factor is to stock market
returns.
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3 Systematic Volatility of Unpriced Earnings Shocks
3.1 Introduction
An unexplained fact in macro finance is that aggregate credit spreads often move in the
same direction as the equity values of the underlying companies, or equivalently debt and
equity prices move in opposite directions. For example, the correlation between the credit
spread of AA bonds and the log price-earnings ratio of the same firms has been only about
–0.50 since 1996 which is also approximately the correlation of the S&P 500 price-earnings
ratio with Baa–Aaa spreads since 1927. This paper argues that the low stock-bond corre-
lation constitutes an important puzzle, and one whose solution sheds light on several other
properties of financial moments.
Certainly discrete corporate events that change leverage ratios may move debt and equity
in opposite directions for individual firms. Equity holders would like to pursue high leverage
in good times motivated by tax benefits at the expense of bond holders. However, our focus
is on credit rating portfolios and their aggregate debt quantities show little fluctuation over
time (later shown by Figure 20). Thus, the puzzle is not likely to be fully explained by the
dynamic capital restructuring.
Recent advances in asset pricing have integrated modeling of debt and levered equity
Figure 18: Stock P/E Ratio and Corporate Bond Spreads
This figure shows the correlation between the S&P 500 index’s log P/E ratio and the Moody’s Baa–
Aaa corporate bond spread over the rolling window of past 60 months. The S&P 500 P/E ratio is
provided by Bloomberg, and the Moody’s spread is provided by the Federal Reserve Bank of St.
Louis.
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with equilibrium determination of discount rates. However, changes in riskless rates, in
market prices of risk, and in corporate cash flows should all move aggregate debt and
equity prices in the same direction. Up to our best knowledge, no one has addressed the
puzzle yet.
A natural mechanism that can account for opposing movement is systematic fluctuations
in the volatility of the unpriced component of cash flows. As is well known, increases in
unpriced risk will lower the risk premium of levered equity and raise its price, while having
opposing e↵ects on risky debt.
The notion of systematic changes to firm-level risk has recently become the focus of
much work in economics. Starting with Bloom (2009), theoretical and empirical studies
have delineated real channels through which stochastic volatility of idiosyncratic produc-
tivity a↵ects aggregate output independent of changes in aggregate productivity (or its
variability). The literature sometimes refers to this distinct component of uncertainty as
“micro” risk, which shows up in changes in cross-firm dispersion measures, in e.g., prof-
itability, earnings forecasts, or stock returns. In our context, the focus is not on the link
between micro risk and economic growth (although this is easy to incorporate in our model).
Rather, it is to show that the existence of this state variable has significant implications for
aggregate financial variables, in particular the relative prices of debt and equity.36
The key idea in our model is that micro uncertainty corresponds to the volatility of
the unpriced component of firms earnings, i.e., the component that does not a↵ect the
representative agent’s marginal utility. This includes the purely idiosyncratic component
of earnings, but more generally also encompasses the component of aggregate dividends
that is uncorrelated with aggregate consumption.37 So, while we refer to uncertainty about
this component as “firm-level” risk, we do not necessarily assume that this component of
earnings is uncorrelated across firms. Instead, the crucial assumption is that the stochastic
volatility of unpriced shocks is itself common across firms.
This hypothesis may explain a number of important facts in asset pricing. Researchers
have long struggled to explain why increases in the risk of equity returns fail to predict
increases in expected returns of the same equity. In the model that we propose, the two
components of risk in dividends – priced and unpriced – have o↵setting e↵ects on the
36There is a direct analogy here with the notion of common stochastic volatility of household risk, e.g.,
labor income. The asset pricing implications of this mechanism are the analyzed by a literature stemming
from Constantinides and Du e (1996).
37It is common for models of the equity premium to assume that aggregate firm cash-flows (or dividends)
are only weakly correlated with – or even independent of – aggregate consumption. That is the polar opposite
case of assuming that unpriced shocks are idiosyncratic.
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risk premium. Likewise, the two components a↵ect the aggregate price-dividend ratio in
the opposite direction, resolving a puzzle proposed by David and Veronesi (2009). Under
general conditions, cross-firm return correlation will move in the same direction as the ratio
of priced to unpriced risk, which can explain the predictability results of Pollet and Wilson
(2010).
The asset pricing literature has previously recognized the important role of unpriced risk
in determining the risk premium on levered equity. Applications of this idea have focussed
on cross-sectional implications. (See for example Johnson (2004) and Barinov (2011).)
Recently, Gilchrist, Sim, and Zakrajsek (2010) have proposed an equilibrium model of debt
and equity issuance by firms facing time-varying uncertainty that alters the relative costs of
each via the same mechanism we model. The interaction of fluctuations in financing costs
with financial constraints leads to aggregate investment fluctuations even without aggregate
productivity shocks.
Relative to this work, our contribution is to show that fluctuations in unpriced risk
story can also work quantitatively as an explanation for aggregate financial moments (even
without frictions). Empirically, we test the model’s implications for the risk premia of debt
and equity portfolios. We also o↵er evidence that historical movements in model-implied
measures of our unpriced-risk state variable do indeed align with direct measures of firm-
level uncertainty.
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the model of levered equity
and credit spreads. Section 3 studies the quantitative implications for return moments in
a plausible calibration. Section 4 verifies empirically the model’s characterization of the
risk premium on debt and equity portfolios and provides evidence on the link between our
financial measure of risk and measures of operating risk. A final section summarizes and
concludes.
3.2 A Model of Debt and Equity
In order to study movements in risky debt and equity prices, we follow Bhamra, Kuehn, and
Strebulaev (2010), Chen (2010), and Gourio (2011) by solving for prices of particular debt
contracts in an economy with time-varying cash-flow moments and Epstein and Zin (1989)
preferences. Our interest is particularly in the evolution of credit spreads on fixed-rating
portfolios (e.g. AAA or AA), whose composition is largely detemined by firm leverage
78
ratios. Thus our focus does not require us to model the quantity of debt as endogenous.38
Our design is most closely related to the study of Chen, Collin-Dufresne, and Goldstein
(2009). Those authors are also interested in the co-evolution of credit spreads and equity
return moments. They establish that a model including a habit-type pricing kernel and
exogenously time-varying default boundaries and recovery rates can generate implied time-
series for credit spreads that have match many features of the data, while also matching
the main moments of equity returns. Our focus is on time-varying fundamental risk, rather
than risk aversion.39 We are also explicitly interested in the e↵ect of leverage on equity
valuation and expected returns.
The set-up of the model mostly follows that of Bansal and Yaron (2004) (hereafter
BY). Time is discrete; there is a single perishable consumable good, the flow of which
comes from an endowment asset. Our interest is in pricing claims to a second flow – the
operating earnings of a particular firm. Letting C denote the consumption stream, D
denote the earnings stream, and lower case letters being logs, the stochastic specification is
the following.
 ct+1 = µc + xt +  c,t ✏
c
t+1 (48)
 dt+1 =    ct+1 +  d,t ✏
d
t+1 (49)
xt+1 = ⇢xt +  x,t ✏
x
t+1. (50)
As in BY, changes in log consumption and earnings have a common expected growth term x,
which evolves as an AR(1) process. Also as in that paper, the innovation terms, ✏c, ✏d, ✏x, are
independent, standard normal random variables. Unlike BY, we do allow for contempora-
neous correlation between  ct+1 and  dt+1 via the   term. Thus, assuming ✏d uncorrelated
with ✏c is without loss of generality. We assume that ✏x is uncorrelated with both cash-flow
components.
The extra volatility in earnings is the key feature of the model. Crucially, we assume
that the stochastic volatility,  d, is not firm-specific: all firms residual earnings are assumed
to be scaled by this distinct component. This is why we call it systematic. Also, as noted
in the introduction, there is no assumption that the ✏d shocks are uncorrelated across firms.
Thus it may be inaccurate to view  d,t as idiosyncratic volatility.40 Rather, the crucial
38In addition, we do not model any feedback from aggregate debt to the primitive cash-flow moments
driving prices.
39The appendix to Chen, Collin-Dufresne, and Goldstein (2009) also analyzes a model with time-varying
cash-flow moments and Epstein and Zin (1989) preferences. We compare our findings to theirs below.
40Aggregating earnings across all traded firms in a portfolio of firms could still leave a substantial risk
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feature of the innovations, ✏d, is that they are unpriced in the sense that they do not covary
with marginal utility.
As the notation indicates, the volatilities of c, d, and x, may all be stochastic. Another
important departure from BY is that we do not assume the same process drives them all.
Instead we assume the (pseudo) variances evolve according to
vc,t+1 = wc + ↵c  
2
c,t + sc ⌘
c
t+1 (51)
vd,t+1 = wd + ↵d  
2
d,t + sd ⌘
d
t+1 (52)
where ⌘c and ⌘d, are i.i.d. standard normal, and  c ⌘
p|vc|,  d ⌘ p|vd|. For parsimony,
we take  x to be constant. The variance processes themselves are assumed homoscedastic
and stationary (the ↵s are between 0 and 1). They may be correlated with each other and
with the expected growth rate, x, but not with the cash-flow processes c and d.
The representative agent has recursive utility with coe cient of risk aversion  , elasticity
of intertemporal substitution  , and time discount rate  . Following BY, a log-linear ap-
proximation to the returns to a claim to consumption permits the log price-dividend ratio,
zc, such a claim to be written as linear function of the state variables, zct = A0+A1xt+A2vc,t,
where the constant As can be found from the Euler equation for the claim via the method
of undetermined coe cients. This makes the log pricing kernel also linear:
mt+1 = logMt,t+1 = ✓ log       ct+1   (✓   1)[A0 +A1 xt +A2 vc,t ]
+ (✓   1)0 + (✓   1)1 [A0 +A1 xt+1 +A2 vc,t+1 ] (53)
where ✓ ⌘ (   1) / ((1/ )  1) and 0 and 1 are constants from the log-linearization. The
expected growth rate of  m is the riskless one-period rate, rft .
We next consider an exogenous division of the claims to the D stream between debt
and equity. Specifically, we assume debt is of the Merton (1974) type: There is a single
zero-coupon claim of face value K which must be paid o↵ at time T . We assume that equity
holders receive all earnings as a dividend stream until time T at which point they receive a
terminal payment of
max [VT  K, 0 ] (54)
where VT is the value of a claim (unlevered) to the flow of dividends after T . Up to a second
component, as indeed it does in the data, and as BY also assume. Our main results do not make any
assumption about cross-firm earnings correlation.
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log-linear approximation, the quantity zd = log(V/D) is also linear in the state variables,
zdT = B0 +B1 xT +B2 vc,T +B3 vd,T . (55)
We adopt this approximate valuation as an assumption. (The Bs can again be directly ob-
tained analytically in terms of the primitives. The full expressions are omitted for brevity.)
Finally, we assume the terminal (and only) cashflow to the debt claim is
min [RT VT , K ] (56)
where RT is a recovery factor. This could be time-varying (possibly including both econ-
omywide and firm-specific variability). For our purposes, it will su ce to use constant
values.
Debt and equity prices (denoted F and S) and expected returns are not obtainable
analytically, but can be readily computed by Monte Carlo integration over any region of
the state space. Before turning to numerical exploration of the solution properties, however,
we outline the key features of the solutions. In fact, the relatioships we wish to highlight
can readily be described in terms of approximate linear projections.
Let cr denote the credit spread of the risky bond in excess of the T -period riskless zero-
coupon rate, cr =   log(F/K)/T  rft,T . Fixing the current level of firm earnings D, as long
as the firm isn’t close to insolvency, this spread behaves like
cr ⇡ k1,c vc + k1,d vd   k1,x x (57)
where all the ks are positive constants. Increases in uncertainty unambiguously hurt debt
holders, whose payo↵ is concave in VT . Credit spreads decline with economic growth, since
unlevered asset values increase with growth.41 Likewise, let pd = log(S/D) be the levered
log price-dividend ratio. It will look like
pd ⇡  k2,c vc + k2,d vd + k2,x x (58)
41The assertions about unlevered asset values are not true for all preference parameters. In particular,
they require  > 1 and   > 1/ . We follow the long-run risk literature in adopting these assumptions.
They are not necessary for our main point, however. For example, under power utility (with a low EIS),
increases in growth rates and decreases in volatility will lower asset values, rather than raise them. But it
remains true that (a) both factors will move bonds and stocks in the same direction and (b) increases in vd
will increase levered equity values and decrease debt values.
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where, again, all the ks are positive (and dropping the intercept).
Comparing pd to cr, the opposite sign on x is just the asset value e↵ect: asset values go
up with growth rates. The opposite sign on vc is also driven by its e↵ect on unlevered asset
values (B2 < 0). Here, however, there is some ambiguity because the convexity of equity’s
claim on V . Most calibrations preserve a negative e↵ect of consumption uncertainty on pd.
This is not true for earnings uncertainty, though. On average, vd is several times larger
than vc. Now even the unlevered claim increases in value with uncertainty (B3 > 0) since
this uncertainty is unpriced. With the option-like payo↵ of levered equity, the e↵ect is
magnified.
The e↵ect of vd is thus to move debt and equity in opposite directions. This observation
is not new. Our contribution is to suggest that the mechanism applies at the aggregate
level and to show the magnitudes can work.
A crucial piece of supporting evidence – and itself a salient and puzzling feature of the
data – is the absence of a strong risk-reward ratio in the stock market. Continuing with
our approximate linear characterization, in the model the risk premium, ⇡S , and volatility,
 S for levered equity (still holding D fixed) look like
⇡S ⇡ k3,c vc   k3,d vd (59)
 S ⇡ k4,c vc + k4,d vd, (60)
for some positive ks. Variation in  S is easy to understand: it all comes through current
dividends.42 The price dividend ratio is volatile, but its volatility is constant by assumption,
and hence goes into the (omitted) intercept. Dividend volatility goes up with both vd and
vc. Comparing the expressions for  S and pd, we see why it is not puzzling (as asserted by
David and Veronesi (2009)) that the two are not perfectly correlated. The e↵ect of vd on
the two quantities is opposite.
Turning to ⇡S , increases in consumption risk raises the equity risk premium because
this is systematic risk. But the ✏d shocks are unpriced (they do not covary with c, vc, or
x). As is well known (Johnson (2004)), increasing unpriced risk of an asset decreases the
expected excess return of a call on that asset. Hence the approximate relations above make
it clear that one should not, in general, expect risk and expected return of levered equity
(or indeed of portfolios of levered equity) to be be perfectly positively correlated. Indeed,
42Recall that all earnings are paid as dividends prior to liquidation. So we use the terms earnings, cash-
flow, and dividends interchangeably.
82
the unconditional correlation can be negative.
This theory of the equity premium also provides an explanation for another set of em-
pirical findings. If it is the case that ✏d shocks are only weakly correlated across firms, then
the average correlation across firms will scale with the ratio vc/vd. Times of relatively high
systemic risk will see stocks co-move more strongly. This is a widely held view. Further, the
model implies that the variance ratio will be strongly positively correlated with ⇡S . Putting
these pieces together, we recover the findings of Pollet and Wilson (2010) who document
both that average cross-stock correlation forecasts market returns positively and that the
component of stock volatility orthogonal to average correlation forecast returns negatively.
In Section 4, we will take these observations further and o↵er supporting evidence for
the relationships that the model implies for risk premia and volatility. First, however, we
turn to numerical results to demonstrate the plausibility of the mechanism embedded in
the model.
3.3 Numerical Implications
To illustrate the magnitudes of the model’s e↵ects, we solve a benchmark parameterization
of the economy and of firm-level cash flows that is in line with previous work with long-run
risk type models. The parameters are shown in Table 16. The time unit is a month. Implied
moments are expressed in annualized terms.
The calibration assumes firm cash flows are about five times more volatile than aggre-
gate consumption. It is important to note that the d process is supposed to describe a
representative firm, not aggregate dividends. For simplicity, we assume that the two com-
ponents of earnings volatility are uncorrelated and that neither is correlated to expected
growth. The same, fixed firm characteristics are used throughout. We do not explore ef-
fects that arise from di↵erences across firms (or ratings classes) in recovery rate, earnings
volatility, volatility persistence, etc. The only firm level heterogeneity comes through the
ratio of earnings to debt face value, D/K. We turn now to the quantitative features of debt
and equity prices and returns that are implied by this set-up.
3.3.1 The Equity-Debt Correlation
The first issue that must be addressed is how to represent within the model a firm belonging
to a specified rating class. Rating agencies di↵er in their stated classification goals. However
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Table 16: Benchmark Calibration
The table shows benchmark parameter values used below for the model described in Section 3.2.
Preferences   7  1.5   0.996
Aggregate µc 0.0015  x 4⇥ 10 4 ⇢ 0.95
Consumption v¯c 8⇥ 10 5 ↵c 0.987 sc 10 5
⇢c,vc 0 ⇢c,x 0 ⇢x,vc 0
Firm Earnings   2
v¯d 2.1⇥ 10 3 ↵d 0.975 sd 2.5⇥ 10 4
⇢d,c 0 ⇢d,x 0 ⇢d,vc 0
⇢d,vd 0 ⇢vd,x 0 ⇢vd,vc 0
Firm Debt K 1 T 4 R 0.6
Aggregate std [µC ] 0.0317  ¯C 0.031 std [ C ] 0.0134
Moments E
⇥
rf
⇤
0.0541
one common objective seems to be to provide a stable mapping from ratings to true default
probabilities, at least unconditionally. Tables of historical default frequencies by rating
are widely published and viewed as meaningful predictors. We therefore interpret a firm
with a given rating to be one whose earnings-to-debt ratio yields an unconditional expected
default probability equal to the historical frequency. Note that this assumption means that
the conditional default probability of a firm with a given rating will vary with the state
of the economy. It also implicitly assumes an idealized immediate response of rating to
changes in cash flow. While oversimplified, the assumption is not radically at odds with
the data. Empirically ratios of EBIT to book debt for fixed-rating portfolios are reasonably
stable over time.
Table 17 shows the calibrated average 4-year default probabilities for four psuedo-rating
classes: AAA, AA, A, and BBB. The model implies realistic credit spreads and moderate
leverage ratios for each grade when their earnings-to-debt level is fixed to match the given
default probabilities. Hence there is not a severe “credit spread puzzle” in this calibration.43
43In an appendix (and in greater detail in working paper versions), Chen, Collin-Dufresne, and Goldstein
84
Table 17: Default Probabilities and Credit Spreads
The table shows the 4-year default probabilities that we use to define four ratings tiers for subsequent
analysis. The next three columns give debt statistics implied for firms having cash-flows defined by
these default probabilities. The first two give market leverage and credit spreads at the long-run
values of the state variables. The rightmost column computes the expected credit spread across
states. The numbers in the last column are calculated from a simulated sample of 1000 years.
Credit spreads are in basis points (annualized) and are computed relative to the 4-year riskless
yield-to-maturity.
E
⇥
Idefault
⇤
F/(S + F ) cr E[cr]
AAA .0004 0.27 12 17
AA .0016 0.31 29 42
A .0052 0.35 75 90
BBB .0140 0.39 145 158
A key objective of the calibration is to explain the degree to which bonds and stocks
fail to comove perfectly. As described in the last section, credit spreads and equity prices
are a↵ected oppositely by the uncertainty of unpriced shocks to earnings. Figure 19 shows
these valuation measures as functions of the two types of uncertainty in the economy for
an A-rated firm (with the expected growth rate at its average level). The plot verifies that
levered equity can indeed respond quite positively to increases in uncertainty that do not
a↵ect discount rates, while the same increase raises credit spreads significantly.
We confirm the importance of the vd e↵ect in Table 18. Here we report the time-series
correlation between credit spreads and log price-dividend ratios for each rating class via
simulation. Note that here we are invoking the key modelling assumption that vd is common
across firms and hence the component of variability in pd and cr driven by this uncertainty
(2009) evaluate credit spreads in long-run risk type models and find them generally too low at the same
time that default rates are too countercyclical. Our benchmark model will indeed have countercyclical
default rates because unlevered asset values decline as growth rates decline and consumption volatility rises.
However our earnings volatility factor ensures that most changes in default rates are uncorrelated with the
aggregate state variables and hence not “cyclical.” At the same time, unconditional credit spreads may
be higher in our model because of the potential for larger losses in default. Chen, Collin-Dufresne, and
Goldstein (2009) examine a di↵usion model with a continuously monitored bankruptcy barrier. It is well
known that such models underprice high-grade debt because of the continuous nature of default, and the
certain recovery value. In our Merton-type model, asset values and recoveries in defaulting states can be
arbitrarily low. Realistic credit spreads in long-run risk type models with jumps-to-default are also obtained
in Chen (2010) and Bhamra, Kuehn, and Strebulaev (2010).
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Figure 19: Equity and Debt Valuation
The figure shows the price-dividend ratio and credit spread for an A-rated issuer as a function of the
two components of uncertainty when the economy’s expected growth rate is at its long-run level.
Table 18: Correlation of Credit Spreads and Price-Dividend Ratios
The table shows the standard deviations of levels and changes of credit spreads and log price-
dividend ratios for each rating class in the benchmark calibration. The moments are calculated from
a simulated sample of 1000 years. Standard deviations are not annualized.
std[pd] std[cr] corr[pd, cr] std[ pd] std[ cr] corr[ pd, cr]
AAA 0.0670 0.0012 -0.35 0.0190 0.0002 -0.44
AA 0.0744 0.0020 -0.44 0.0200 0.0005 -0.52
A 0.0760 0.0035 -0.52 0.0220 0.0009 -0.60
BBB 0.0820 0.0048 -0.60 0.0246 0.0013 -0.67
is still present at the portfolio level. The table also verifies that there is significant and
realistic variability in each valuation measure over economic states.
As in the data, our calibrated correlations are significantly di↵erent from -1. We re-
gard this as a significant achievement: it is not possible in models that explain aggregate
movements in credit spreads solely through discount rate channels or through variations in
systematic risk. However these types of variation are undoubtedly also present: the cyclical
component in credit spreads is a solidly documented empirical fact. However it is clearly
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Figure 20: Debt Quantities
The figure shows three measures of debt quantities for A-rated issuers. The lowest line is the ratio
of long-term debt to total assets. The middle line is long-term debt plus the debt component of
current liabilities scaled by total assets. The top line is total liabilities scaled by total assets. For
each series, the value reported is the median across A-rated companies in each month. Data are
from Compustat quarterly files.
not the whole story.
As noted in the introduction, another factor that could account for the imperfect (nega-
tive) correlation between credit spreads and equity values is capital structure adjustments.
We suggested that these were unlikely to be large at monthly frequency, and this is partic-
ularly true for fixed-rating portfolios. However, it is possible that some type of aggregate
shock (increased expected growth rates, for example) could raise unlevered asset values in
such a way that leads firms to increase leverage or dividends so much that credit spreads
rise despite increased asset values. It remains an open question whether this mechanism
can be made to work quantitatively in models of endogenous leverage choice.44 However,
Figure 20 shows that, in the data, the actual quantity of debt of fixed-rating firms shows
little variation. Moreover, in preliminary tests (unreported) we find that innovations to
these series have little explanatory power for the component of credit spreads orthogonal
to stock prices.
44The comovement of price-dividend ratios and credit spreads are not analyzed in the calibrations presented
in Bhamra, Kuehn, and Strebulaev (2010) and Chen (2010). This is an interesting area for future research.
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Table 19: Projection of Return Moments on State Variables
The table shows the least-squares projection of the first and second moments of returns for levered
equity (S) and risky debt (F ). The projections are calculated from a simulated sample of 1000
years for a A-rated firm. The projections are computed using return moments and state variables
in annualized units.
 d  c µc + x
⇡S -0.30 1.48 -0.01
 S 1.24 1.73 -0.54
⇡F 0.01 0.17 0.01
 F 0.19 0.52 -0.37
3.3.2 Return Moments
Our explanation for the divergence of stock and bond markets has one immediate corollary
that neatly accounts for a longstanding puzzle for theorists: the absence of a strong positive
relation between (equity) market risk and market expected returns. We now examine the
implications of the calibrated model for these moments, and the corresponding moments
for debt. There are two goals. First, we want to illustrate the theoretical relationships
determining these moments in terms of the state variables. Then we want to look past
the state variables and deduce the implications of the model in terms of observables. In
particular, we want to understand how credit spreads and price-dividend ratios should be
related to financial risk and risk premia.
Table 19 shows least-squares projection coe cients of the excess expected return (⇡)
and volatility ( ) of levered equity and debt (S and F , respectively) on the state variables.
The projection is computed over a simulated sample of 1000 years.45 Here all moments are
expressed in annualized units, as are the state variables. The findings in this section are
not very sensitive to the choice of ratings tier. To avoid repitious results, we now restrict
attention to an A-rated firm (or portfolio).
From the first line, there is substantial variation in the levered equity risk premium in
this calibration. Moreover the positive relation between expected return and fundamental
risk, as captured by  c, is economically strong. On the other hand, as surmised in the
45The moments are not realized sample values, but true one-period moments computed by numerical
integration over a range of the state variables.
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last section, earnings risk lowers stock expected returns. While the projection coe cient
for  d is lower than that for  c, firm-level earnings are about five times more volatile than
aggregate consumption. Thus we would expect to see the dominant component of variability
in return predictability coming through this channel.
From the second line, equity volatility is stochastic in this model. We have not directly
included any mechanism to make the unlevered price-dividend ratio’s volatility time varying.
Hence volatility is stochastic mainly because of the direct e↵ect of changing uncertainty
about dividends. Because consumption and dividends are correlated, both of these state
variables a↵ect  S positively. (Equity volatility declines with the growth rate because asset
values rise, decreasing market leverage.)
The third line contains an important negative observation: even though earnings uncer-
tainty makes debt less valuable, it does not do so enough to induce a significant e↵ect on
bond risk premia. While there is a positive e↵ect of consumption risk on the risk premium
for bonds (as there is for stocks), the bonds we are examining are quite safe and their risk
premium is not large. From the fourth line, variation in their risk is also small across states
of the economy.
The first two lines of the table illustrate the ambiguous nature of the risk-reward trade-
o↵ in the stock market, when risk is measured by stock return volatility. While both
components of economywide uncertainty raise that volatility, they have o↵-setting e↵ects
on the risk premium for levered equity. It is important to understand that this is crucially
due to the presence of leverage. While increases in earnings uncertainty do have a positive
e↵ect on the value of unlevered equity, this is purely due to Jensen’s inequality, and does
not reflect a decrease in the risk premium. Because of the opposing e↵ects of vd on the
first and second moment of levered equity returns, we should expect to observe an unstable
relation between market volatility and future returns.
To quantify the models implications in terms of observable financial variables, Table 20
shows OLS coe cients from several pseudo-predictability regressions. The dependent vari-
ables are true moments not realized moments, so the significance levels cannot be compared
to actual empirical specifications. It is also important to bear in mind that the exercise
here pertains to a fixed-rating portfolio, i.e., that the series being simulated assume a fixed
D/K at each observation date. Di↵erent relationships would be implied for a fixed firm,
i.e. whose earnings-to-debt would vary at each time-step.
Panel A shows some weak relationships. As shown in the first line, the unconditional
risk-reward e↵ect in this calibration is actually negative. While the e↵ect is stronger than
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Table 20: Moment Predictability
The table shows regressions coe cients of return moments on observable financial variables. The
regressions are performed in a simulated sample of 1000 years for an A-rated firm. The dependent
variables ⇡S , ⇡F and  S are the first and second moments of returns for levered equity (S) and risky
debt (F). The independent variables pd, cr and  S are standardized. The variable   ? is the residual
from a projection of stock volatility on the sum of pd and cr. Newey and West (1987) t statistics
(absolute value) using 12 lags are shown in parentheses.
pd cr  S pd+ cr   ? R2
Panel A. Univariate Forecast
dep var:
⇡S . . -0.0079 0.14
(10.3)
 S 0.0129 . . 0.04
(4.5)
Panel B. Multivariate Forecast
dep var:
⇡S -0.0198 -0.0054 . . . 0.79
(74.3) (15.8)
⇡S -0.0235 -0.0122 0.0067 . . 0.80
(25.8) (7.9) (4.2)
⇡S . . . -0.0125 0.0260 0.75
(40.3) (28.9)
⇡F . . . -0.0001 0.0013 0.05
(0.1) (1.9)
seen in the data, several prominent studies (including Campbell (1987) and Nelson (1991))
have indeed reported negative estimated relationships. The next line shows the lack of a
strong negative association between stock volatility and the price-dividend ratio, which is
the subject of David and Veronesi (2009). Empirically, there is a strong negative association
between stock returns and stock volatility. This would be true in the model as well, for a
fixed firm whose leverage was varying with shocks to its earnings.
By contrast, Panel B shows that levered equity returns exhibit distinct and strong
predictability patterns. Here the first two regressions show that when used in conjunction
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with the levered price-dividend ratio, credit spreads contain important negative forecasting
power for market returns. This is because they actually do a better job at picking up
increases in earnings volatility than stock volatility does. The negative role for credit spreads
has been documented empirically by Gilchrist, Yankov, and Zakrajsek (2009) and Gilchrist
and Zakrajsek (2011), but stands in contrast to a long-standing view in empirical finance
that default premia, have positive forecasting power for market returns. (For example Keim
and Stambaugh (1986) and Fama and French (1989).) Here we note that that our results
pertain to short-horizon (one month) expected returns. In the model, credit spreads do
respond positively to increases in output risk (vc) which is positively related to the equity
premium. If vc is taken to be a more persistent process than vd, then long-horizon regressions
could discern a positive association with credit spreads. Also notable in the second line in
Panel B, the model predicts that we should recover a positive role for stock volatility when
used in conjunction with the other variables.
As discussed in the introduction, intuitively, when bond and stock markets moving in
opposite directions it suggests that firm-specific (unpriced) risk has increased. This logic
suggests that, when pd and cr are standardized, their sum may be a reasonable proxy for
this risk. Figure 21 confirms this by showing the relation between this sum and vd in the
simulated history. Given this proxy, the remaining component of stock volatility should be
largely driven by vc.
The fourth regression in Table 20 Panel B shows that using these two factors does indeed
capture most of the predictability in the three financial measures. The final line verifies the
finding in Table 19 that, for corporate bond returns, the model implies no predictability
through the vd mechanism.
Summarizing, this section has shown that a plausible calibration of a model with system-
atic volatility in unpriced earnings shocks can quantitatively account for several important
and little-understood features of aggregate financial moments. We next present supporting
empirical evidence on the implications we have illustrated.
3.4 Empirical Evidence
Our model implies a set of distinct relations between the two components of uncertainty
in the economy and debt and equity prices. Building on this, the last section explained
the implied mapping between those prices and subsequent return moments. We now of-
fer evidence that first supports this latter mapping and then supports the former link to
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Figure 21: A Proxy for Unpriced Earnings Uncertainty
The figure the level of unpriced earnings uncertainty, vd, against the sum of normalized price-
dividend ratio and normalized credit spread for an A-rated firm. All values are computed in a
simulated sample of 1000 years using the Benchmark parameter values of Table 16.
uncertainty components.
Following the analysis in Table 20, we employ three financial measures (stock log P/E
ratio, corporate bond spreads and stock return volatility) to build the following proxies for
the two volatility factors, vc and vd:
vˆd = normalized P/E ratio + normalized corporate bond spread (61)
vˆc = stock return volatility orthogonalized by vˆd. (62)
The identification of vd is based on the model’s implication that equity becomes relatively
more expensive than corporate bonds when uncertainty shocks do not raise discount rates.
In addition, given that stock return volatility is not a↵ected by long-run growth rate (xt),
its changes can be attributed to a combination of vc and vd only. Thus, vˆc is estimated as
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the residuals from regressing stock return volatility on vˆd.
3.4.1 Risk Premium Forecasts
Table 21 tests our predictions regarding risk premia. As implied by the model, vˆc is related
to the market price of risk, thus expected to predict positive equity and corporate bond risk
premium. Meanwhile, vˆd should predict negative stock returns and positive but negligibly
small corporate bond holding returns.
In this table, six portfolios are formed with various datasources. The first portfolio is
based on the S&P 500 index. Its P/E ratio is provided by Bloomberg under the index’s
INDX ADJ PE field. Its corporate bond spreads are proxied by the BofA Merrill Lynch
US Corporate AA Option-Adjusted Spread.46 The second to fifth portfolios are based on
AAA, AA, A and BBB credit ratings. Their P/E ratios are estimated as each portfolio’s
total market capitalizations divided by the sum of net income and depreciation over the
past one year, which are collected from Compustat. Each portfolio is matched with BofA
Merrill Lynch spreads of its own credit rating. The last portfolio is based on financial firms
whose SIC codes begin with 6xxx and credit ratings are either AAA or AA except Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac. Its P/E ratios are estimated from Compustat, and credit spreads
are proxied by 3-year interest rate swap spreads. Stock return volatility is estimated from
each stock’s daily stock returns over the past six months and then their equal-weighted
average is taken for each portfolio. vˆd and vˆc are then constructed for each portfolio as per
equations (61) and (62).
Panel A regresses each portfolio’s stock excess returns at time t+1 on the raw financial
measures at time t.47 All predictors show strong significance and their R2s range from 4.6%
to 13.8%. As in the calibration in Section 3, credit spreads enter significantly and negatively.
As discussed above, this is consistent with the findings of Gilchrist and Zakrajsek (2011)
but at odds with a prior literature, both empirical and theoretical, which views credits
spreads as positively associated with risk premia. Also as in Table 20, the unconditional
relationship in our sample between stock volatility and expected returns (not reported) is
insignificant.
Panel B regresses stock returns on our proxies vˆd and vˆc. As in the model, vˆd is neg-
atively associated with future returns, while the association with vˆc is positive. Both of
46http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/categories/32297
47The table uses each portfolio’s equal-weighted stock returns. The results with value-weighted returns
show little di↵erence.
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Table 21: Risk Premium Forecasts
The dependent variables in Panel A and B are each portfolio’s equal-weighted excess stock returns in the next
month, and those in Panel C and D are Vanguard intermediate-term corporate bond fund excess returns.
The sample is 168 monthly observations from December 1996. Numbers in parentheses are OLS t statistics.
***, **, and * denote significances at 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
group S&P 500 AAA AA A BBB Financials
Panel A. Stock Portfolio Returns on Raw Values
Log P/E -6.428*** -5.466*** -6.607*** -12.218*** -8.292** 0.338
(-3.367) (-3.692) (-4.200) (-3.883) (-2.404) (0.202)
Spreads -3.849*** -4.576*** -4.160*** -2.773*** -1.921*** -11.345***
(-4.618) (-5.112) (-4.748) (-4.109) (-2.661) (-4.081)
Realized 0.042*** 3.214*** 3.418*** 2.528*** 3.046*** 0.895*
Volatility (3.499) (3.811) (3.876) (3.222) (2.636) (1.833)
R2 0.122 0.138 0.130 0.111 0.046 0.095
Panel B. Stock Portfolio Returns on vˆc and vˆd
vˆd -1.115*** -0.882*** -0.876*** -1.120*** -0.326 -0.792**
(-3.276) (-2.897) (-2.988) (-3.099) (-0.958) (-2.378)
vˆc 0.972** 1.487*** 1.176** 1.038** 1.242** 0.422
(2.112) (3.027) (2.449) (2.526) (2.012) (0.720)
R2 0.080 0.096 0.083 0.088 0.029 0.036
Panel C. Vanguard Intermediate-Term Corporate Bond Fund Returns on Raw Values
Log P/E -1.274** -1.440*** -2.118*** -1.467 -0.014 -0.137
(-2.264) (-2.700) (-3.850) (-1.411) (-0.014) (-0.362)
Spreads -0.643** -0.800** -0.995*** -0.326 0.141 -1.990***
(-2.494) (-2.475) (-3.236) (-1.457) (0.672) (-3.157)
Realized 0.012*** 0.976*** 1.166*** 0.607** 0.159 0.391***
Volatility (3.407) (3.197) (3.772) (2.339) (0.474) (3.521)
R2 0.074 0.063 0.104 0.046 0.039 0.079
Panel D. Vanguard Intermediate-Term Corporate Bond Fund Returns on vˆc and vˆd
vˆd -0.040 -0.041 -0.098 0.015 0.176* -0.060
(-0.395) (-0.380) (-0.981) (0.128) (1.795) (-0.817)
vˆc 0.477*** 0.573*** 0.673*** 0.368*** 0.291 0.380***
(3.505) (3.301) (4.087) (2.730) (1.638) (2.906)
R2 0.065 0.062 0.096 0.043 0.034 0.052
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the relationships are statistically significant in most specifications, with vˆd being stronger
than vc. The predictability of stock returns by vˆd is a new result that verifies a central
implication of the model.48
Turning to bond returns, in Panels C and D we find stronger predictability than sug-
gested by the model. But, consistent with the model, none of the predictability now comes
through vˆd. Even though unpriced risk does raise the equity risk premium, its e↵ect on the
debt risk premium is negligible.
Table 21 covers the period from December 1996 which is the period spanned by our
primary credit spread data. In order to check whether the conclusions are specific to this
time span and other measurement details, Table 22 and Table 23 repeat the regressions
with alternative data.
The table focuses only on the S&P 500 portfolio returns since its P/E ratio covers the
longest sample period, starting in January 1954. In column (1), the VIX index is used in
place of realized volatility. In column (2), 3-year interest rate swap spreads from Bloomberg
substitute for AA credit spreads. In column (3), Moody’s US intermediate-term corporate
spreads49 are used. Column (4) and (5) use the spread of Moody’s Aaa/Baa corporate
bond yields50 over 30-year Treasury bond yields.51 In column (6) to (7), Moody’s Baa–Aaa
corporate bond spreads are used. Their corresponding sample periods are specified in each
table’s Panel A. The dependent variables in Table 22 are the S&P 500 index’s excess returns
in the next month, and those in Table 23 are the excess returns from holding Vanguard
Short-Term Corporate Bond Fund, which started in January 1983.
Both tables’ Panel C confirm that vˆc and vˆd have the same forecasting power as in the
main tests, regardless of which data sources are used. The exception to this is that stock
return forecastability is weaker when the sample is extended back to 1954. This is not
a failure specific to our proxies: the raw variables including the dividend-price ratio also
become insignificant, suggesting broad based structural change over this period.52
The results in this section can be summarized as follows. First, vˆc and vˆd have positive
and negative forecasting power (respectively) for stock returns. Second, vˆc but not vˆd shows
48We have verified that the finding here is robust to correction for small sample predictability bias (Stam-
baugh (1999)).
49http://credittrends.moodys.com/pro/chartroom_chart.asp?status=1&script_name=/pro/
chartroom_chart.asp&cid=77
50http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/AAA?cid=119
51http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2006/200628/200628abs.html
52We also note that most credit spread data fails to adjust for bond call options which induces significant
measurement error during periods such as the late 1970s having high volatility of nominal rates.
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significant predictive power for returns on corporate debt. Last, the findings are robust to
alternative measurement methods for at least the last 25 years.
3.4.2 Uncertainty Measures
We have suggested that our measure of bond-stock disagreement is a proxy for firm-level
uncertainty, and we have shown that it has predictive properties for returns that are consis-
tent with this interpretation. However, so far, we have not shown any direct evidence that
links our proxy to actual measures of uncertainty. We now do so.
To start, Figure 22’s Panel (a) compares vˆd with realized stock return volatility. In
order to extend the sample as far back as possible, the S&P 500 P/E ratio and Moody’s
Baa–Aaa corporate bond spreads are used to build the proxies. The figure shows a strong
positive association thoughout the post-War period. While this is a basic prediction of the
model, it is not mechanical. No return volatility is used in the construction of vˆd. While it
is well-known that increases in stock volatility coincide with increases in credit spreads, the
same is not true of the price-dividend ratio, which is usually viewed as negatively associated
with volatility (e.g. “leverage e↵ects”).
Our contention about vd is more specific however. We interpret it as picking up changes
in “unpriced” risk, i.e., in the component of earnings that is unrelated to aggregate mo-
ments. Recently, the empirical macroeconomics literature has begun to estimate speci-
fications of firm-level output that identify exactly this distinction between “macro” and
“micro” uncertainty. Panel (b) of Figure 22 compares vˆd with Bloom, Floetotto, Jaimovich,
Saporta-eksten, and Terry (2011)’s productivity dispersion index,53 a measure of the cross-
firm dispersion in residual productivity shocks.54 In the context of our model, cross-firm
output dispersion would scale directly with vd. The figure shows that vˆd and productiv-
ity dispersion are indeed closely correlated. This is highly suggestive given the completely
distinct ways in which the two indices are derived.
Our interpretation of vˆd is further bolstered by evidence that its complementary mea-
sure, vˆc, captures macro uncertainty. As discussed in Section 2, under general conditions,
increases in the latter component should raise the common variablity in earnings across
stocks, and thus raise stock return correlation. Hence our interpretation implies that vˆc
53Available from http://www.stanford.edu/~nbloom/.
54The authors use data at time t to estimate the dispersion at t   1, so Figure 22’s Panel (b) moves the
estimates to the right by one year.
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Figure 22: Comparing vˆd with Other Uncertainty Measures
Panel (a) compares vˆd with log stock return volatility, and Panel (b) compares with Bloom, Floetotto,
Jaimovich, Saporta-eksten, and Terry (2011)’s productivity dispersion. vˆd is denoted on the left axis, and
the others are on the right. vˆd is estimated as the sum of normalized S&P 500 P/E ratio and Moody’s Baa–
Aaa corporate bond spreads. Panel (b) draws the average of vˆd each year since the productivity dispersion
is provided on an annual basis.
(a) Realized Stock Return Volatility
(b) Bloom, Floetotto, Jaimovich, Saporta-eksten, and Terry (2011)’s Productivity Dispersion
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Figure 23: Comparing vˆc with Other Uncertainty Measures
Panel (a) compares vˆc with the average correlation among individual stock returns, and Panel (b) compares
with Baker, Bloom, and Davis (2012)’s economic policy uncertainty. vˆc is denoted on the left axis, and the
others are on the right. vˆc is estimated as the stock return volatility orthogonalized by vˆd. Panel (a) draws
the average of vˆc every quarter since the stock return correlation is provided on a quarterly basis.
(a) Pollet and Wilson (2010)’s Average Correlation among Individual Stock Returns
(b) Baker, Bloom, and Davis (2012)’s Economic Policy Uncertainty
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should be positively associated with the average correlation among individual stock re-
turns. Panel (a) of Figure 23 shows the time-series of average correlations constructed
by Pollet and Wilson (2010) together with vˆc. The coincidence is striking. Indeed, the
graph provides independent corroboration of Pollet and Wilson (2010)’s claim that average
correlation forecasts returns positively because it proxies for changes in systematic risk.
Finally, the assertion that vˆc is related to the uncertainty in broad macroeconomic
conditions can be assessed with direct (non-financial) measures as well. Panel (b) compares
vˆc with Baker, Bloom, and Davis (2012)’s economic policy uncertainty.55 The authors
estimate economic policy uncertainty as an average of the following three variables: (i) the
frequency of references to economic uncertainty and policy in 10 leading newspapers, (ii)
the number of federal tax code provisions set to expire in future years, and (iii) the extent
of disagreement among economic forecasters over future federal government purchases and
the future CPI price level. The figure shows reasonably consistent agreement between the
two measures.
3.5 Conclusion
This paper introduces a very simple change to a standard model of aggregate asset prices
that has very powerful consequences. Motivated by the often persistent divergence in debt
and equity valuations (holding credit rating fixed), we propose distinguishing between two
components of systematic volatility, corresponding to the priced and unpriced components
of firms’ cash flows. The finance literature has previously appreciated that variation in
unpriced risk could potentially account for a variety of e↵ects in the cross-section of stock
returns. Recent macroeconomic literature has advanced the idea that firm-specific uncer-
tainty could have a systematic component which evolves separately from aggregate uncer-
tainty. Putting these ideas together can not only account quantitatively for the degree
of bond-stock disagreement, it can also explain several previously documented first-order
relationships (or lack of relationships) between return moments. Given the power and the
parsimony of this one modeling device, we believe it will become a standard feature of any
successful macro finance theory.
55Available from http://www.policyuncertainty.com/
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